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RECLAIMING INDIGENOUS LEGAL AUTONOMY
ON THE PATH TO PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE:
THE THEORY, PRACTICE, AND LIMITATIONS OF TRIBAL
PEACEMAKING IN INDIAN DISPUTE RESOLUTION
WILLIAM C. BRADFORD*
"Nothing is gained by dwelling upon the unhappy conflicts that have
prevailed .... The generation of Indians who suffered the privations,
indignities, and brutalities of the westward march of the white man have
gone to the Happy Hunting Ground, and nothing that we can do can
square the account with them. Whatever survives is a moral obligation
resting on the descendants of the whites to do for the descendants of the
Indians what in the conditions of this twentieth century is the decent
thing.
It is most unfortunate to try to measure this moral duty in terms of
legal obligations .... The Indian problem is essentially a sociological
problem, not a legal one."
-Justice Robert Jackson, Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United
States, 324 U.S. 335, 355 (1945)
"One law shall be to him that is homeborn, and unto the stranger that
sojourneth among you."
-Exodus 12:49
I. THE TENSION BETWEEN INDIGENOUS LAWMAKING AS A
COLLECTIVE RIGHT AND THE UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS
REGIME
A. PRIVATE LAWMAKING: CHALLENGE TO STATE SOVEREIGNTY
From time immemorial, long before the advent and rise to primacy
of the system of nation-states following the Treaty of Westphalia in
1648, disputes have been resolved in accordance with legal rules and
procedures developed in small, cohesive, insular communities organized
and sustained along the lines of religion, I culture, ethnicity, guild,2 and
* LL.M. Candidate, Harvard Law School, 2001; J.D., University of Miami, 2000; Ph.D.,
Northwestern University, 1995. The author is grateful to Professor Clark Freshman of the University
of Miami School of Law for his guidance and encouragement. He is also grateful to all his ancestors,
whose sacrifices have become his opportunities.
1. See Clark Freshman, Privatizing Same-Sex "Marriage" Through Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion: Community Enhancing Versus Community-Enabling Mediation, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1687, 1750
(1997). Religious courts have been resolving disputes between members of their faiths by applying
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territory. 3  The traditional Austinian vision 4 posits that law originates
with the state as the command of the sovereign backed by the threat of
force. 5 This cramped and artificially cabined position ignores the fre-
quent incapacity of positive public regulations to overcome the contrary
influence 6 of ubiquitous private and autonomous spheres of lawmaking
to "penetrate all social ordering." 7 In fact, a welter of private frame-
works that prescribe and proscribe the behaviors of particular groups
coexists with official public law. On occasion these many and varied
forms of private law (also known as autonomous, primitive, customary,
or "folk law"8) challenge the authority of the state.9  Totalitarian
particular written aspects of religious law as well as religious custom for millennia; Jewish courts
continue to do so in the United States. See id.
2. See, e.g., Mikel v. Scharf, 444 N.Y.S.2d 690, 691 (N.Y. App. 1981). Justice has traditionally
been dispensed not in state-sponsored forums but at the "primary institutional locations" of human
activity.
3. Tribal justice lingers below the waterline of sovereignty in many nations across the globe.
Recently a 28-year-old Australian aboriginal man, released after 20 months in prison for the homicide
of his nephew in a drunken brawl, was subjected to traditional aboriginal punishment after a northern
territory court agreed to recognize the traditional "payback" system of tribal justice. See Christopher
Zinn, Aborigines Win Back the Right to Swift Justice, GUARDmAN (London), Dec. 5, 1997, at 19. His
family speared him 14 times in his legs and beat him unconscious with a nulla-nulla war club. See id.
After recovering, the happy man, now welcomed back into his tribe, indicated that he had accepted
traditional punishment to "show my family I was sorry for what I did .... My skin (family) group
made sure it was done in the proper way and my life was not in danger. I faced my family and
community in the open. Now things can settle." Id. In response, an angry Shane Stone, Attorney
General of the Northern Territory, stated that "payback" was "barbaric and unacceptable. There is
no way we will have two laws up here." Id. To this, Justice Dean Mildren, the sentencing judge,
responded, "The courts don't encourage payback, we don't say it's lawful, we don't wish to do
anything to facilitate it. But on the other hand, when we know that it's going to happen we can't
ignore it." Id. Tribal justice continues to be the principle method of dispute resolution in Haiti,
Georgia, Albania, and Yemen, where a "tooth for a tooth" is the governing legal regime save for the
payment of financial compensation, and it is a subsidiary method in Arab nations where the
quasi-sanctioned method of redress for the stain on familial honor caused by the wayward conduct or
the rape of its female members is the "honor killing" of these women and girls. See Douglas Jehl, For
Shame, N.Y. TiMEs, June 20, 1999, § 1, at 3.
4. See Walter Otto Weyrauch & Maureen Anne Bell, Autonomous Lawmaking: The Case of the
"Gypsies," 103 YALE L.J. 323, 328 (1993). The authors provide a broad definition that considers law
an:
existential condition in which men are carriers of rights and duties, privileges and
immunities. No formal structure supporting the system of law need be visible. Those
accustomed to seeing law only in its formal institutions, in terms of statutes, decisions,
judges, legislators, and administrators miss the point. Law can be found any place and
any time that a group gathers together to pursue an objective. The rules, open or covert,
by which they govern themselves, and the methods and techniques by which these rules
are enforced is the law of the group.
Id.
5. See Nancy A. Costello, Walking Together in a Good Way: Indian Peacemaker Courts in
Michigan, 76 U. DEr. MERCY L. REV. 875, 895-96 (1999).
6. See Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 4, at 334.
7. Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 4, at 327.
8. See Andrea M. Seielstad, Unwritten Laws and Customs, Local Legal Cultures, and Clinical
Legal Education, 6 CuNICAL L. REV. 127, 142-43 (1999). According to Seielstad, "folk law" is a:
"socially defined group's orally transmitted traditional body of obligations and
prohibitions, sanctioned or required by that group, binding upon individuals or subsets of
individuals (e.g., families, clans) under pain of punishment or forfeiture." It is
synonymous with customary law, unwritten law, indigenous law, living law, primitive
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political systems have proscribed civil society and consociation with
other interpretive communities entirely and rejected contending legal
systems within their boundaries ipso facto. Liberal political systems have
tended to fashion domestic orders more conducive to personal freedom
and to the limited development of autonomous legal systems.10 Never-
theless, much private lawmaking is colorable as a functionalist response
to the desire for group cohesion and the satisfaction of fundamental
human needs, such as cultural and ethnic expression. I I Western liberals
have branded elements of autonomous legal systems, whether the harsh-
ness of particular punishments, the perceived absence of due process or
equal protection guarantees, or the expression of relations of intragroup
domination, 12 as "contextually paranoiac and ... counterproductive,"
13
even threatening to the majoritarian legal regime. 14 Western liberal
law, and a number of other terms .... The legal systems of other "folk" societies have
historically been devalued and marginalized as "primitive," illiterate, or otherwise
less-sophisticated than the Anglo-American legal tradition.
Id. (quoting FOLK LAW: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY AND PRACICE OF LEx NON SCRIwrA at xiii (Alison Dundes
Renteln & Alan Dundes eds., 1994)).
9. See Richard Herz, Legal Protection for Indigenous Cultures: Sacred Sites and Communal
Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 691, 691 (1993). Herz maintains that any worldview or value system in
competition for the allegiance of the people with the dominant culture can undermine political and
social stability and tends to do so in proportion to the legitimacy of the state as equal representative of
all. See id. Moreover, for those states with clouded claims to territorial sovereignty, the threat of an
internal collective indigenous legal identity with land claims and values contrary to those of the official
state legal regime is particularly potent and not limited only to questions of legitimacy; the very
existence of the state within its boundaries is called into question. See id. at 691-92.
10. See generally W. Michael Reisman, Autonomy, Interdependence, and Responsibility, 103
YALE L.J. 401 (1993).
11. See Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 4, at 399; see also Bill Maurer, Writing Law, Making a
"Nation": History, Modernity, and Paradoxes of Self-Rule in the British Virgin Islands, 29 L. & Soc'Y
REV. 255 (1995) (arguing that a "nation's law is one of the key components of a unifying nationalism
[that] helps ... define and then regulate our national selves; [flor modem subjects, the ability to make
law is the mark and preserve of independent political society and of the rational, modem individuals
making it up").
12. See supra text accompanying note 3.
13. Reisman, supra note 10, at 410.
14. See Reisman, supra note 10, at 402. The private lawmaking of the Roma, also known as
Gypsies, has come under considerable scrutiny in recent scholarship, with much criticism directed at
the absence of Western notions of due process and equal protection in informal adjudications and
punishments of breaches of Roma purity laws. In brief, Roma adjudication is concerned primarily
with the well-being of the interdependent group and the minimization of legal contact with the state,
even at the expense of what non-Roma might call due process and individual rights. See Weyrauch &
Bell, supra note 4, at 389-94. For the Roma, the vindication of individual rights are so much less
important than the reestablishment of the peace of a stateless community which has historically been
subjected to persecution and even genocide and is now surrounded by foreign and hostile majoritarian
cultures. See Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 4, at 389-94. Consequently, dissent as to the adjudication
and punishment of group taboos is subordinated, along with traditional Western standards of fairness,
to group cohesion. See Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 4, at 394. For a functionalist argument as to the
substantive rationality of autonomous Roma lawmaking and its role in securing the survival of Roma
society in host nations, see Weymuch & Bell, supra note 4, at 391. Also see Reisman, supra note 10, at
402 n.5 ("Given that, over the centuries, the Roma have almost continuously been targets of
discrimination and genocidal campaigns, the success of the Romani legal and political system in
securing the group's collective survival is remarkable.").
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creed has begun to concede the intimate nexus between culture 15 and
law,16 which advocates of private lawmaking stress as the wellspring of
their systems of social regulation. The Western liberal-multicultural state
has been unable to acknowledge that its public law is the cultural product
15. See W. Michael Reisman, International Law and the Inner Worlds of Others, 9 ST. THoMAS L.
REV. 25, 25 (1996) (explaining the "rectitude process" of the New Haven School of International Law
which maintains that "[e]ach culture, in its unique context, records ... experiences in ways that
provide meaning, guidance and codes of rectitude that serve as compasses for the individual as he or
she navigates the vicissitudes of life"); see also Guy 0. Faure & Gunnar Sjostedt, Culture and
Negotiation: An Introduction, in CULTURE AND NEOOTIATION 1, 3 (Guy 0. Faure & Jeffrey Z. Rubin
eds., 1993) (defining the term "culture" as a "set of shared and enduring meanings, values, and beliefs
that characterize national, ethnic, or other groups and orient their behavior which is transmitted from
one generation to the next and shapes interactions with others and the environment").
16. See Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J.
1545, 1607 (1991) For Grillo,
"[d]isputes are cultural events, evolving within a framework of rules about what is worth
fighting for, what is the normal or moral way to fight, what kinds of wrongs warrant
action, and what kinds of remedies are acceptable." The process by which a society
resolves conflict is closely related to its social structure. Implicit in this choice is a
message about what is respectable to do or want or say, what the obligations are of being
a member of the society or of a particular group within it, and what it takes to be thought
of as a good person leading a virtuous life.
Id. (quoting Sally Engle Merry & Susan S. Silbey, What Do Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Concept
of Dispute, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 151, 153 (1984)). Consequently, for those more suited to thinking of the
community as the domain of conflict resolution and to incorporating the interests of the adversary in
this process, the adversary system is contraindicated. See id.
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of the individualist traditionl 7 of its dominant social group' 8 and is
prone to cultural narcissism in relation to private legal systems. 19
17. See Mary Douglas, Culture and Collective Action, in THE RELEVANCE OF CULTURE 39, 44
(Morris Freilich ed., 1989). As a fundamental part of their cosmology, indigenous tribal social orders
generally define everything as a public good from which no individual can be excluded and that
traditional Indian tribes cannot conceive of individual claims to rights as existing independently of a
membership stake in the collective. See id. In stark contrast, the methodological individualism of
liberal Western political philosophy is so deeply ingrained in American legal culture that skepticism
pervades any discussion of the roles of community and culture despite the historical contingency and
cultural situatedness of much of Western legal scholarship. See id. As a result, it is essentially
impossible for the Western mind to seriously entertain indigenous claims to collective legal rights. See
id.; see also Rupa Gupta, Indigenous Peoples and the International Environmental Community: Accom-
modating Claims Through a Cooperative Legal Process, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1741, 1760-62 (1999).
Gupta further illuminates the genesis and legal significance of this philosophical disjunct as follows:
Western thought originates with the isolated individual separated from organized
society and concentrates on the relationship of the individual to the state. In the Western
tradition of natural law, individuals voluntarily enter into a social compact in which
individual autonomy is exchanged for peace, security, and protection provided by the
sovereign. This transition to organized society inherently rests on the perception that the
Hobbesian "state of nature" is inferior to and separate from civilization.
Rights are conceptualized as constraints on the government in favor of the
individual, created from those powers not delegated to the sovereign.... Further, rights
are considered limitations on the power of the state and good government is equated with
regulating the state and not strengthening group affiliations.
Indigenous or tribal political systems, on the other hand, are "a web of reciprocal
relationships without a separately institutionalized 'state,"' where kinship assigns roles to
individuals "as if they were species in an ecosystem." Each individual plays multiple
roles, and leaders are recognized for segments of the web-families, genders,
generations-representing "countervailing responsibilities." This design facilitates the
inclusion of all relevant parties in decisions . . . . In contrast, the Western conception
leaves little room for these group affiliations or collective or societal rights outside the
context of a nation-state.
Id. (quoting Russel Lawrence Barsh, The Challenges of Indigenous Self-Determination, 26 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 277, 297 (1993)).
18. See Christine Zuni Cruz, On the Road Back In: Community Lawyering in Indigenous
Communities, 5 CINIcAL L. REV. 557, 567 (1999); see also Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 4, at 386-87
(noting that law "cements the cultural unity" of peoples, even in the American legal system where
"[a]lthough American law presents itself as neutral, it still functions to... represent aspirational norms
that are rarely fully realized, but instead hold out a promise.., equality of all people, for example.");
Reisman, supra note 10, at 415 (suggesting that "much of the way 'we' organize our individual and
collective lives is neither natural nor particularly rational, but rather a cultural choice largely shaped
by historical forces that we deem to be natural, necessary and, usually, right").
19. Cross-cultural observation and analysis of legal systems is difficult even for the most
sympathetic researcher because "each of us is profoundly shaped, at levels of consciousness so deep
that we are unaware of it, by our own culture's categories. We observe others in our terms. In those
terms, others can seem incomprehensible or stubbornly and maddeningly irrational." Reisman, supra
note 10, at 403. However, it is not only Western analysts who stereotype, make unsympathetic
assumptions, or use non-reflective and domestically contingent methodologies and theoretical lenses to
superimpose disfavorable value judgments upon dissimilar cultures. Emotional attachment to a
familiar legal system and to a preconceived notion of other legal systems is common to all cultures,
and yet so great is the power of law among all other disciplines to destroy and to sanction the
destruction of other cultures, legal systems, and polities that "[n]owhere more than in law do you need
armor against that type of ethnocentric and chronocentric snobbery-the smugness of your own tribe
and your own time: We are the Greeks; all others are barbarians." See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE
BRAMBLE BUSH 44 (1930). The antidote to this transcultural proclivity requires a dispassionate and
direct investigation of different cultures that transcends the individual capacities of most researchers;
nevertheless, sympathetic comparativism requires that we "define ourselves neither by distancing
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Consequently, liberal Western states are given to the reflexive and
illiberal circumscription of subsidiary political and legal entities. As Reis-
man cautions, this reactivity obstructs the liberal state in its performance
of the critical intellectual and governance task. This task is already com-
plicated by the development of an interdependent and global civil
society. Determining when, how, and to what extent minority groups
claiming the right to exercise autonomous lawmaking authority may
"discharge themselves from the reach of general community norms" 20
without compromising the liberal project of promoting respect for and
observance of the universal human rights regime remains to be seen.
B. STATISM AND LIBERAL INDIVIDUALISM: IMPEDIMENTS TO THE
ACCOMMODATION OF THIRD GENERATION RIGHTS CLAIMS
Attempts to accommodate minority group claims to cultural and
legal autonomy within liberal multicultural states have, until recently,
foundered upon the primary tenet of Western political philosophy-the
conception of rights as inhering only in individuals and states. 21 Human
rights jurisprudence has recently begun to reconsider the questions of
indigenous group rights. 22 However, most human rights advocacy re-
mains staunchly individualist and unabashedly uncritical of the impo-
sition of external standards with "no ... intrinsic claim for accuracy" 23
other than their Western and individualist pedigree, by which to evaluate
certain divergent cultural and legal practices of minority groups. These
and other unresolved "doctrinal questions about the incorporation of
whole groups . . . into a system designed for protecting individuals from
others as counterpoles nor by drawing them close as facsimiles but by locating ourselves among
them." Nora V. Demleitner, Challenge, Opportunity and Risk: An Era of Change in Comparative Law,
46 AM. J. Comp. L. 647,653 (1998).
20. Reisman, supra note 10, at 415.
21. See Herz, supra note 9, at 695. Although there is variation between national legal systems,
the Western legal tradition is generally individualist, adversarial, predicated upon self-interested repre-
sentation by lawyers, and rooted in all-or-nothing frequently monetary-decisions by neutral factfinders
on the basis of fixed, positive legal principles. As such, it is ill-suited to the exposition or redress of
group claims, particularly those arising from historical conflicts with dominant groups acting without
the official imprimatur of the state. For an exegesis of the Western/Anglo-American adversarial legal
tradition, see Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Peacemaking: How the
Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 235,
259-63 (1997).
22. See Lawrence Rosenn, The Right to Be Different: Indigenous Peoples and the Quest for a
Unified Theory, 107 YALE L.J. 227, 242 (1997) (book review) (establishing that early affirmations of
the legal rights of indigenous peoples offered by "discovering" Europeans at the time of contact with
the New World succumbed by the eighteenth century to a state-centered Eurocentric system no longer
capable of accommodating indigenous peoples and their cultures as equals but well suited to
disrespecting and eradicating them in the interests of "progress" and the fulfillment of a "divine
mission"). Contemporary international law recognizes neither assertions of collective cultural rights
by aboriginal peoples against state sovereignty, treaties between indigenous peoples and states, nor
indigenous peoples' rights to self-determination. See id.
23. Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 4, at 395.
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acts of the state"24 perpetuate minority discontent and hinder the
perfection, not only of orderly and just multicultural domestic polities,
but also of the universal human rights regime.
This conflict is by no means unilateral. At the same time they are
threatened by the competing claims of other lawmaking communities,
indigenous peoples propagate a discourse that, by positing alternative
visions and repositories of rights, including the right of collectives to
self-determination, threatens the construction of a post-World War II
universal human rights regime normatively grounded in the indivisibility
of individual and communal rights.25 The resulting tension between the
desire of a self-determining collective unrecognized as a sovereign state
to freely pursue its own economic, social, and cultural development on
the one hand, and the moral and legal obligation of the recognized state
within which the collective is located to apply international human rights
conventions such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,26 the
International Convention for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),27 and
the 1979 United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, 28 has never been effectively resolved.29
24. Ruth L. Gana, Which "Self"? Race and Gender in the Right to Self-Determination as a
Prerequisite to the Right to Development, 14 Wis. INT'L L.J. 133, 151 n.96 (1995).
25. See Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in
Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754, 1765 (1997) (enumerating the inconsistencies and
historical ironies in federal Indian law).
26. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess. (1948).
27. See International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 53; U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR] (requiring protection of
individual rights without regard to race, color, or sex and mandating gender equality in the exercise of
all civil and political rights while at the same time guaranteeing the right of persons belonging to
ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities to enjoy their own culture and the right to preservation of
customs and legal traditions).
28. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 19 I.L.M.
33, 34 (1980) (stating in its preamble that "the welfare of the world and the cause of peace require the
full participation of both men and women").
29. While it is arbitrary and potentially prejudicial to international order and peaceful relations to
suggest that groups can and should gain rights only by becoming states or dominant majorities within
states, "intermediate" notions of communal rights have not thus far gained sufficient currency in
international rights discourses. However, a number of scholars have employed the term "interpretive
community" in an attempt to bridge the space between the rights of individuals and the rights of states
into which, heretofore, the rights of collectives have been unable to fit. See Nell Jessup Newton,
Memory and Misrepresentation: Representing Crazy Horse, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1003, 1004 n.2 (1995)
(arguing that each Indian tribe is an interpretive community with the right to self-definition and
-determination); see also STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORiC, AND THE
PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LnTERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 141 (1989) (suggesting that indigenous groups,
despite their lack of formal legislative and executive institutions, are distinct "interpretive
communities" autonomously entitled to develop, without interference, "a point of view or way of
organizing experience that share[s] individuals in the sense that its assumed distinctions, categories of
understanding, and stipulations of relevance and irrelevance [a]re the content of the consciousness of
community members who were therefore no longer individuals, but insofar as they were embedded in
the community's enterprise, community property."). By deploying the concept of interpretive
communities, Fish and Newton open the door to reconsidering indigenous communities as political
entities to whom individual obligations of community members are owing even at the limited expense
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:551
None of the various international human rights instruments, in-
cluding the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 30 has
overcome state interference or harmonized normative conflicts over the
extent to which the legal systems of minority groups exercising claims to
self-determination ought to be permitted to abridge or limit the funda-
mental human rights of individual members. 31 Whether traditions of gen-
der discrimination within indigenous communities ought to take legal
precedence over national or international human rights guarantees
couched in individualist language, and whether tribal members ought to
be free to assert interests contrary to the interests of their tribes even to
the extent of being able to "opt out" of tribal decisions32 (i.e., to be
of individual freedom or autonomy. However, although by this construction indigenous communities
are analogous to states not only are Western liberal multicultural states far more supportive of
individual autonomy than are most indigenous communities, but any reconception of sovereignty which
loosens the requirements threatens the present states-system and the prerogatives attendant.
30. See United Nations Commission on Human Rights Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimi-
nation and Protection of Minorities: Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples [hereinafter Draft Declaration], 34 I.L.M. 541, 550 (1995) (adopted Aug. 26, 1994) (codi-
fying as a matter of customary international law collective rights which both limit state discretion and
impose affirmative duties upon states vis-a-vis their indigenous peoples). The United Nations Eco-
nomic and Social Council created the Working Group on Indigenous Populations in 1982 for the ex-
press purpose of developing international human rights norms for the protection of indigenous peoples;
the Draft Declaration, the result of more than a decade of concerted but frustrated efforts, establishes
in relevant part the right of indigenous peoples to employ their own legal systems in Article 13, which
maintains that "indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practice, develop and teach their
spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies." Id. at art. 13.
31. See Rosenn, supra note 22, at 247. The World Conference on Human Rights held in June
1993 in Vienna advocated the accommodation of national and regional particularities in the internation-
al human rights norm-setting process and in the development of customary international law on human
rights. See Draft Declaration, supra note 30. However, the specific question of whether, to what
extent, and on what basis indigenous cultural practices ought to be accorded consideration in this pro-
cess of accommodation has been held largely in abeyance and left to states' interpretations of existing
international human rights conventions and to the development by the states-members of the
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities specifically and the
U.N. General Assembly generally of the Draft Declaration. See Draft Declaration, supra note 30 and
accompanying text.
32. See Freshman, supra note 1, at 1759-60. Contemporary theories of multiculturalism maintain
that the cultural values of communities, particularly those, which contribute to group survival, are in-
herently entitled to mutual respect. However, Freshman builds upon the political and legal notion of
informed consent to suggest that a "sincere attempt to apply [certain] cultural values may subordinate
individuals," particularly those who, after reasoned deliberation, either elect not to participate in the
choices and arrangements of their tribal communities or elect to accord their allegiance to other
communities constituted on a basis other than tribal membership. Freshman, supra note 1, at 1759.
Similarly, Reisman takes to task the Historicist School. See generally Reisman, supra note 10.
Reisman does not view law as the product of conscious allocative choices subjected constantly to the
destructive influences of intragroup power and oppression both formal and informal. See Reisman,
supra note 10, at 401. Rather, he views law as a predestined evolutionary end-product uniquely and
mystically shaped by historical group experiences. See Reisman, supra note 10, at 401. Reisman
teaches that the "[indigenous law] should be allowed to grow, at its own pace and according to its own
preordained genetic program," and "erstwhile social do-gooders" should "look but don't touch,"
regardless of the "ugly violence that is [sometimes] applied." Reisman, supra note 10, at 401,407-08.
For adherents of the Positivist School, there are few if any permanences of group differences in cul-
ture and behavior, and "[a]lthough group survival is obviously the sine qua non of collective life .... it
is, by itself, not enough for appraisal." Reisman, supra note 10, at 410. For Reisman and others, while
"[i]t would be ... arrogant and preposterous... to reject the practices of others simply because we do
not agree with or like them .. . [t]he pertinent question is not the ... compatibility [of others'
558
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able to participate in the process of self-determination as individuals), 33
have proven to be thorns in the sides of the architects of international
rights regimes in recent years. 34
practices] with ours, but whether their application is likely to precipitate consequences that are
inconsistent with or violative of international human rights standards." Reisman, supra note 15, at 34.
Indigenous legal systems "can simultaneously promote survival and pursue policies that are extremely
costly to some [group] members." Reisman, supra note 10, at 410. When this occurs, whether by
direct abuse or by denying them information to prevent them from discovering the "utility-decreasing
nature of... group ... organization... [or] outdated but entrenched customs," to Positivists state
intervention may unfortunately be necessary in defense of universal and transcultural norms. Eric A.
Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective
Action, 63 U. Ctu. L. REv. 133, 143-44 n.24 (1996).
33. See Gana, supra note 24, at 135, 151-52 (arguing for reconceptualization of "self-determi-
nation" as an individual human right against which to hold collectives accountable for the treatment of
women and other dissenters).
34. In international judicial fora the jurisprudence is confused. In 1977, the Maliset tribe stripped
Sandra Lovelace of her membership as a result of her marriage to a non-Indian. See Lovelace v.
Canada, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex 18, at 166, U.N. Doc
A4/36/40 (1977). Although Maliset men who married non-Indian women were not stripped of mem-
bership, the Canadian court rejected a gender discrimination claim on the ground that in accordance
with the Canadian Federal Indian Act (Act), a measure passed to protect the Canadian Indian minority
in compliance with the mandate under Article 27 of the ICCPR granting minorities the freedom to
"enjoy their own culture, religion, and language," the Maliset were entitled to the widest latitude of
discretion in the management of tribal affairs. Id. at 166-67. However, the U.N. Human Rights
Committee found the broad interpretation of the Act violated Lovelace's Article 27 rights, noting that
Article 27 only provides an individual right to participation in a group, not a group right per se, and
suggesting that states have the responsibility to see that group rights do not impinge individual rights.
See id. at 173-74.
However, Ivan Kitok, a member of the indigenous Sami, was prevented from herding reindeer
by his former village, a decision upheld by Swedish courts on the ground that Swedish law granted
considerable autonomy to the Sami on membership matters. See Kitok v. Sweden, U.N. GAOR, Hum.
Rts. Comm., 43d Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex 7(G), at 221, U.N. Doc A/43/40 (1988) (views adopted
July 27, 1988). When Kitok appealed to the U.N. Human Rights Committee, alleging a violation of his
right to enjoy his own culture under Article 27 of the ICCPR, the Committee upheld the Swedish ruling,
stating that the interests of the group could sometimes outweigh the interests of an individual. See id. at
230.
The political debate is lively in the U.S. domestic arena. In 1978, Julia Martinez, a member of
the Santa Clara Pueblo, brought discrimination charges in federal court against her tribe after a tribal
ordinance, which provided that children of female (but not male) members who married outside the
tribe would not be tribal members, barred her child from tribal membership. See Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 52-53 (1978). On appeal the Supreme Court held that U.S. law did not create
an implicit cause of action to challenge a tribal ordinance on equal protection grounds as judicial
"intervention" would undermine the authority of Indian tribes, which had been permitted by Congress
to retain limited sovereignty, to include determining their own membership. See id. at 64, 72. Enraged
white feminists suggested that a tribe that discriminates against women is not entitled to acceptance
within a multicultural, liberal state; some even argued that Indian culture should be "sanitized" and
"restructured" legally to accord women equal protection as a matter of U.S. constitutional law. See
Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. Cm. L. REV.
671, 725 (1989) (expressing apprehension over the "ease with which the Supreme Court ... assumed
the 1939 Ordinance to be an artifact of Santa Clara sovereignty"); see also Carla Christofferson,
Tribal Courts' Failure to Protect Native American Women: A Reevaluation of the Indian Civil Rights
Act, 101 YALE L.J. 169, 169-70, 179-84 (1991) (arguing "[Indian] women [are] virtually paralyzed
within a system that subordinates women" and proposing a federal law requiring that all tribes amend
their constitutions to accord Indian women equal protection). However, Indian feminists decried the
assumption that perspectives on equality and oppression could be conflated as well as the essentialist
distortion that constructed female identity as more important than tribal identity despite an abject
cultural ignorance of "Indianism." See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 588, 593 (1990). Indian feminists stressed not only that the power of the
tribe to determine its membership was a primary constituent of sovereignty but that Indian
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Most non-indigenous Western scholars, imbued as they are in the
spirit of individualism and public law universalism, 35 would accept the
collective rights of indigenous groups over their members, if they
entertain questions of group rights at all,36 only to the extent that such
authority is indispensable to the protection of individual rights. 37 For
Reisman, the legal practices of indigenous groups that far too frequently
impose deprivations upon "weaker members of the group" are "no
longer tolerable" and can "no longer be insulated from appraisal
simply and exclusively by invoking talismanic terms like 'sovereignty,'
'domestic jurisdiction,' 'tradition,' 'history,' the supposed wills of
assorted divinities, 'the way we have always done things,'
'autonomy,' or as alleged preconditions for 'group continuity.' 38 In
sum, to the individualist jurisprudence, the practices of all groups must
be appraised in terms of the international code of human rights and
adjusted in conformance with that code.39
C. INDIGENOUS COLLECTIVISM: CLARION CALL FOR COLLECTIVE
RIGHTS
By contrast, for indigenous scholars and advocates, the individualist
methodology of human rights discourses not only forcibly imposes its
own cultural values 40 but, by bifurcating individual and collective rights,
"partnership" societies accorded women coequal status despite role differentiation and frequently
elevated female members to leadership positions. See Gloria Valencia-Weber & Christine P. Zuni,
Domestic Violence and Tribal Protection of Indigenous Women in the United States, 69 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 69, 88-96 (1995) (arguing that since 67 Indian women had served as heads-of-state by 1981,
non-Indian intervention on behalf of Martinez was unnecessary; female tribal members could be
protected via traditional gender relational systems while preserving tribal cultural values and not
disrupting viable Indian polities).
35. See David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International
Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 545, 604 (declaring that public law internationalism should deem
cultural practices such as female genital mutilation (FGM) to be "basic challenge[s] to the structure of
public law" and to an aspirational regime of international governance despite the fact that FGM is
practiced consensually by individuals within the private domain).
36. For an exposition of the liberal tradition of dismissing group rights, see, for example, Vernon
Van Dyke, The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory, 29 WORLD POL. 343,
346-49 (1977) (discussing the contributions to the development of liberal political philosophy of
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau).
37. See Reisman, supra note 10, at 416.
38. Reisman, supra note 10, at 416-17.
39. See Reisman, supra note 10, at 416.
40. See Resnik, supra note 34, at 727. According to the traditional political theory of liberal
democratic governance:
Liberal democracy offers majoritarianism with the side constraints of individual rights.
But in a majoritarian society, some must win and some must lose, and if pervasively dis-
similar cultures are yoked together within a single majoritarian state, the minority culture
will lose systematically. For these minority cultures, the promise of majoritarianism is not
one of self-determination; it is rather one of subjection to an alien power.
Liberal democracy, in other words, may offer the greatest possible opportunity for
disparate groups to live together amicably within a single nation-state, but the very
mechanisms that make cohabitation possible for some cultures-majoritarianism, the fran-
chise, and individual rights... make cohabitation impossible for others. Liberalism may
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prevents indigenous communities from securing benefits, enjoyable only
in collectives, against social disruptions triggered by dissatisfied or
deviant (former) members. 41 These benefits include: self-determination,
religion, law, traditional relational values, and other distinct aspects of
culture and sovereignty. 42 According to this contending theory of
rights, simply because there is a "disparity between the legal
institution[al] perception of what is 'right' and the perceptions of those
subject to the law," there is no reason to invalidate the norm which
undergirds the sense of rectitude. 43 Although indigenous peoples are
eager to escape the poverty under which they frequently labor, forces
operating to improve their material conditions by requiring their cultural
and legal assimilation as a precondition, 44 threaten a superordinate
value-group identity. In the refusal to recognize a regime of collective
rights as the principal defensive weapon for indigenous peoples to wield
against this onslaught, indigenous scholars and advocates find the seeds
of ethnocide. Ethnocide is defined as "any act which has the aim or
effect of depriving [indigenous people] of their ethnic characteristics or
cultural identity [or] any form of forced assimilation or integration,
[such as the] imposition of foreign life-styles." 45
seek to make culture irrelevant to political status, but ultimately liberalism is itself a
culture, one that imposes its own orthodoxy.
David Williams, Legitimation and Statutory Interpretation: Conquest, Consent, and Community in
Federal Indian Law, 80 VA. L. REV. 403, 423-24 (1994).
41. See Herz, supra note 9, at 698. Many of the collective rights which indigenous groups
actively defend cannot be disaggregated and enjoyed as individual rights, and thus any institutional
attempts to reconfigure them to fit within the individual rights lexicon is predestined to failure. As
Herz notes:
[E]ssential elements of communality, those that make group association valuable to the
human experience, tend to operate as constraints on the individual; they therefore
present a direct affront to the individualist leanings in American and international law.
Such communal elements include socialization processes, kinship structures, moral
standards, and community-based religions. Because these are things individuals cannot
develop except in relation to an integrated group, group claims in support of them cannot
readily be translated into the language of individual rights. They present a qualitatively
different assertion of right, so that an individual rights perspective, no matter how
enlightened, can never be logically sufficient to protect the value of communality.
Herm, supra note 9, at 699.
42. See Herz, supra note 9, at 709.
43. James W. Zion & Robert Yazzie, Indigenous Law in North America in the Wake of Conquest,
20 B.C. INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 55,74 n.114 (1997).
44. Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 4, at 371 (noting that while indigenous groups have demon-
strated a remarkable capacity for and acceptance of adaptation, which implies adjustments necessary
to survive as a group and cope with a surrounding hostile environment, they are abjectly unwilling to
commit to a program of assimilation, which implies the demise of their distinct cultures). It is the
personal experience of the author that many indigenous people believe that if further adaptation is
necessary, it ought properly to be the duty of the majority culture.
45. Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: First Revised Text of the Draft Universal Declar-
ation on Rights of Indigenous People, at 6, P5, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1989/33 (1989). Despite the
failure of international human rights instruments and institutions to resolve the conflict in favor of
indigenous rights, several commentators insist that these are the most useful tools in the defense of
indigenous rights against increasing state encroachment upon these rights, particularly in those states
with independent judiciaries and legal systems which incorporate international customary law. See,
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D. PRIMARY CHALLENGE TO INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE IN THE
NEW MILLENNIUM
The significance of the Kulturkampf threatening liberal states and
the international human rights regime they champion over the cultural
claims of their indigenous collectives can be summarized as follows:
[International human rights scholars] generally make two sorts
of arguments, explicitly or implicitly, about cultural differences
.... First, that cultural differences are not that big a deal and
one might safely assume that they will either stay below the
waterline of sovereignty, perhaps within the realm of personal
preferences, or will yield softly to the pressures of assimilative
globalization; and second, that they are a big deal and may well
limit the ambit of universal or internationalist governance. 46
For liberal multicultural states, one of the most pressing tasks of the new
millennium will be the resolution of the uncomfortable dilemma now
facing them: how to preserve and respect their indigenous cultures with-
out drawing a cordon sanitaire about indigenous communities and seal-
ing off their divergent cultures from interaction with majority polities or
worse--compromising the universal individualist human rights agenda.47
The solution may well be located in none other than the principal
proponent of the global human rights legal regime. Yet it is ironic that
in perhaps no other contemporary nation-state is the cultural conflict
between the individualist and the collective notions of rights so clearly
manifested in the domestic legal regime as it is in the sole remaining
superpower. Carefully constructed national myth insulates mainstream
Americans from the historical and contemporary realities of the cultural,
e.g., Curtis G. Berkey, International Law and Domestic Courts: Enhancing Self-Determination for
Indigenous Peoples, 5 HARv. HuM. RTs. J. 65 (1992). However, others insist that only more extensive
structural protection beyond that guaranteed by liberal individualism, such as collective self-determi-
nation and group representation in legislatures, can defend against ethnocide. See, e.g., Robert N.
Clinton, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples as Collective Group Rights, 32 ARiz. L. Rev. 739 (1990); see
also Robert A. Williams, Jr., Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law:
Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660.
46. Kennedy, supra note 35, at 615-16.
47. An atmosphere of distrust and suspicion, bred of centuries of maltreatment and abuse of
indigenous peoples by a host of states only recently committed to liberal multiculturalism and
indigenous rights, will complicate the attempt to merge these two seemingly dichotomous positions into
a unified theory of liberal rights. Many indigenous peoples, convinced that liberal political theory and
international law are structurally unresponsive to indigenous histories and cultures despite the
beneficent intentions of many of their advocates, will condemn any such attempt to generate a unified
theory as little more than a statist ploy to pay lip service to indigenous claims while coopting indigenous
elites and gradually completing the assimilation of indigenous peoples into mainstream bodies-politic.
For an explanation of this impediment to constructive solutions to the fundamental problem of
international governance, see Rosenn, supra note 22, at 251-58.
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political, economic, and legal oppression of the indigenous people 48 of
the United States. 4
9
II. THE GREAT DISPLACEMENT: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
LEGAL SYSTEM CONFRONTS INDIGENOUS LEGAL
SYSTEMS
A. WORLDS OF DIFFERENCE: CULTURAL INFLUENCE UPON LEGAL
SYSTEMS
Although the more than five hundred tribes of Indians were recog-
nized under international law as sovereign nation-states prior to the
formation of the United States, 50 with the birth of the American nation
an unremitting cycle of federal policies designed to "civilize" the
indigenous inhabitants has compromised their economic independence
and political self-determination. While genocide, land expropriation,
population transfers, cultural assaults, and the institutional forces of
politico-economic dependencySl "severely tested the adaptive insights
48. In this article the terms "Indian" and "indigenous" will be used to describe the living
descendants of the aboriginal inhabitants of the United States. Such people generally refer to
themselves as members of their particular nation, tribe, community, pueblo, or village, but, as the
Indian scholar Robert Porter notes, if the occasion arises to refer to themselves as part of the broader
population of indigenous peoples,
the chosen term is invariably "Indian." "Native American" is a term of relatively recent
origin and most likely reflects the "politically correct" trend to be inclusive of all native
people within American society. In my view, the term perpetuates colonial efforts to
subordinate indigenous sovereignty to mere ethnicity, as in the case of African-
Americans or Irish-Americans.
Porter, supra note 21, at 237 n.7.
49. For a thorough explanation of the origins and functions of the American national myth as the
"divine" inspiration for the birth and construction of the American nation, see Ward Churchill,
American Indian Self-Governance: Fact, Fantasy, and Prospects for the Future, in AMERICAN INDIAN
POLICY: SELF-GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 37, 39 (Lyman H. Legters & Fremont J.
Lyden eds., 1994).
50. See Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV.
225, 228-29 (1994).
51. For a thorough and unflinching historical review of U.S.-Indian relations, see THE AGGRES-
SIONS OF CIVILIZATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY SINCE THE 1880s (Sandra L. Cadwalader & Vine
Deloria, Jr. eds., 1984); see also WILcOMB E. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND/WHrE MAN'S LAW: A
STUDY OF THE PAST AND PRESENT STATUS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 5-15 (1971) (demonstrating the
destructive function of 200 years of federal Indian law which authorized and sanctioned legislative
and executive policies, including coercive and fraudulent treaty-making, genocide, forcible population
transfers, forcible cultural annihilation, destruction of traditional tribal societies and legal systems, and
the creation of politico-economic dependency). Specific federal legislation, including the Indian
Removal Act of 1830, the General Allotment Act of 1887 [hereinafter Allotment], the
Wheeler-Howard Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 [hereinafter IRA], House Concurrent Resolution
108 of 1950 [hereinafter Termination], and Public Law 959 of 1950 [hereinafter Relocation], imposed
military, political, economic, legal, and philosophical limitations on indigenous rights to sovereignty and
self-determination. See LAURENCE A. FRENCH, THE WINDS OF INJUSTICE: AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT 45-74 (1994). French described the resulting holocaust:
For more than five hundred years attempts have been made to exterminate, assimilate, or
otherwise eliminate Native Americans from the American hemisphere. Their privation
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and skills"52 of Indian tribes in their struggle to remain in existence as
free self-determining peoples, 53 it has fallen to federal Indian law, per-
haps more than any other policy instrument, to sanitize the conquest of
the Indian people by European invaders and justify their colonization.
Moreover, it is precisely the many layers of difference between
traditional Indian justice systems and the Anglo-European justice system
that provided the point of entry for this process of substitution of legal
systems.
B. THE PROTOTYPICAL INDIAN LEGAL SYSTEM
In brief, traditional Indian tribal society 54 permits no separation
between the civil and the sacred, and spiritual significance touches every
facet of life, including law.55 Moreover, for Indian tribes56 law, together
with language, music, race, ethnicity, religion, and worldview, is a
knows no equal in American history. No other group within the United States has been
subjected to such cruel, harsh, and deceptive exploits at the hands of dominant society
and for such a long period of time. Massacres at the hands of military and civilians,
slavery, wars, removal, treaty deceit, starvation, disease, genocide, forced sterilization,
and cultural genocide are some of the methods used in the Euro-American effort to
destroy the native peoples and their cultures in the American hemisphere.
Laurence Armand French, Native American Repriations: Five Hundred Years and Counting, in WHEN
SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH: THE C oNTRovERsY 0 VER APOLoGIEs AND R EPARATIONS FOR H UMAN INJUSTICE 241
(Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999).
52. Valencia-Weber, supra note 50, at 259.
53. See Steven Haberfeld & Jon Townsend, Power and Dispute Resolution in Indian Country, 10
MEDIATION Q. 405, 408 (1993).
54. See Jennifer Roback, Exchange, Sovereignty, and Indian-Anglo Relations, in PROPERTY
RiGHTS AND INDLAN ECONOMIEs 5, 15 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1992) (noting that in the pre-Columbian
era indigenous tribes were almost exclusively loosely-joined political organizations, which depended
for their physical and organizational survival upon the diligent contributions of their entire membe-
rships and thereby required the voluntary consensus in all fundamental decisions of all their members);
see also John H. Moore, Political Economy in Anthropology, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NORTH
AMERICAN INDIANS 3 (John H. Moore ed., 1993) (explaining that to the extent that a central tribal
organization could be said to exist, it functioned solely to coordinate activities and to redistribute
resources to fill gaps in uncertain political economies and that to the extent "leaders" were chosen to
make decisions these individuals were required to advise, consult, and attain unanimity among those
they "led"); William N. Fenton, Leadership in the Northeastern Woodlands of North America, 10 AM.
INDIAN Q. 21, 22 (1986) (noting that an absolute principle of consensus some scholars label "demo-
cratic extremism" developed to screen against unwilled radical changes which might damage physical
safety or traditional integrity or threaten tribal solidarity). After contact with Euroamericans, tribal
organization evolved into a form of council democracies in which a small cohort of elders were
selected on the basis of a capacity for good judgment and experience to provide a more centralized
leadership function, and with that role differentiation was introduced. See Roback, supra at 15. Never-
theless, although a system of well-elaborated individual responsibilities replaced the earlier mode of
production the principles of consensus, unanimity, and conflict avoidance were preserved, as what
might be deemed the "Western" concept of individual rights was perceived as threatening to the col-
lective good of the tribes. In sum, Indian tribes prior to conquest were egalitarian political structures
that concentrated collective energies upon the attainment of harmony between all elements of their
social life. See Roback, supra at 15.
55. See Herz, supra note 9, at 703.
56. Given the number of tribes (more than 400 recognized and an additional 100 unrecognized)
as well as their heterogeneity, it is easy to overgeneralize when making broad assertions about their
commonalties; nevertheless, many tribes share certain fundamental organizing principles and it is
possible to discuss them in limited general terms without compromising their uniqueness.
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primary constituent of their collective and communal culture. 57 In the
traditional indigenous conception, law is not of human construction but
is rather "something fundamental that has existed from the beginning of
time, providing spiritual and emotional thought and guidance. Law
leads people to correct themselves and restore harmony. Law is the
source of a healthy, meaningful life, and thus 'life comes from it."958
Although no Indian tribe had codified a body of written law as of
1776, many tribes had a traditional and customary "law . . . derived
from rules of conduct and attitudes of the mind concerning their kinship
system." 59 The purpose of such law was not to punish offenses, but to
condition members to adhere to a sacred system of well-elaborated
individual duties and responsibilities and thereby maintain tribal values
of order, harmony, and peace within their tightly interrelated and inter-
dependent communities. 60 Consequently, traditional indigenous legal
systems emphasized communication, accountability, truth, restoration,
forgiveness, and integration of the offender back into the community. 6 1
As a result, disputes within the tribe were typically resolved not in formal
institutions using formal adjudicative procedures, but rather with the aid
of respected elder members of the tribe who would guide the parties to a
compromise restorative of the community. The compromise would
encourage them to disregard blame in favor of focusing on tribal values
and the reestablishment of peace, relationships, and harmony.62 In this
traditional Indian dispute resolution model, advice was given to people to
aid them in meeting their communal responsibilities. Apologies were
requested and given, and symbolic economic restitution was made. 63
Quite simply, punishment was almost invariably a hinderance to the
mission of rehabilitation and restoration of communal harmony. 64 In
57. See Zuni Cruz, supra note 18, at 566.
58. Costello, supra note 5, at 895-96; see also Valencia-Weber, supra note 50, at 228-29 (explain-
ing why traditional indigenous perspectives on law, derived from origins in a complex and challenging
natural world where community aid cooperation were essential preconditions for survival, establish
restoration of intratribal harmony and balance as the overarching goal of all Indian dispute resolution).
59. See Ken Traisman, Native Law: Law and Order Among Eighteenth-Century Cherokee, Great
Plains, Central Prairie, and Woodland Indians, 9 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 273, 274 (1981) (quoting John
Philip Reid, The Cherokee Thought: An Apparatus of Primitive Law, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 283-84
(1971)).
60. See id.
61. See Costello, supra note 5, at 896.
62. See Porter, supra note 21, at 254.
63. See Diane LeResche, Editor's Notes, Native American Perspectives on Peacemaking, 10
MEDIATION Q. 321, 322 (1993); see also Traisman, supra note 59, at 282 (describing how among the
Central Woodlands tribes mediation was often performed by elders to determine the specific amount
to be paid in restitution, and, as an illustration of the flexibility and creativity of this process, noting that
a murderer was required to marry the widow to compensate for her loss).
64. Nevertheless, although behavior was not governed by published laws enforced by police,
courts, and jailers, a sense of communal responsibility buttressed by powerful unwritten social codes
deterred and punished most aberrant behavior. Public opinion, expressed by ostracism (a fate
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sum, Indian tribal justice systems relied upon oral custom and unwritten
rules transmitted intergenerationally to establish appropriate conduct and
resolve disputes. "[T]hough it appeared to the casual white observer
that anarchy reigned," 65 Indian tribes produced a clearly understood
jurisprudence developed by an absolute consensus and reinforced by a
pervasive religion, which functioned despite the absence of the
"paraphernalia of European civilization." 66
C. THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM
The radically different Anglo-European model imported by dis-
covering nations focused on individual rights, the placement of the
burden of proof on the accusers, and the punishment and removal of the
offender from the community by imprisonment. 67 The absence of
described as "worse than death" in that it deprived the individual of means of material and emotional
support), shunning, and ridicule and supported by the fear of disgrace, kept law and order; reciprocal
arrangements for support aided in the honoring of restitution agreements. See Traisman, supra note
59, at 275.
65. WILLIAM T. HAGAN, INDIAN PoucE AND JuDGEs 11 (1966); see also Seielstad, supra note 8, at
140 (relating the intensity of emotion with which traditional Indians cling to their legal systems as an in-
herent part of their culture: as she relates the words of retired Navajo Nation Supreme Court Justice,
Tom Tso, "What h[eld] us together [wals a strong sense of values and customs, not words on paper. I
am speaking of a sense of community so strong that, before the federal government imposed its system
on us, we had no need to lock up wrongdoers.").
66. WASHBURN, supra note 51, at 40. The development of Indian tribal society in the absence of
formal legal institutions does not imply that Indian tribes were perpetual models of harmony. Still,
prior to the Euroamerican arrival, a system of dispute resolution existed in which, despite the absence
of coercive centralized authority, enforceable economic sanctions, supported by reciprocal arrange-
ments for communal support including the severe sanction of ostracism, could be imposed via pro-
cedures most similar to a blend of contemporary mediation and arbitration. See WASHBURN, supra note
51, at 40-41. Remarkably, however, the guilt or responsibility of the parties was almost never at issue,
whereas the sole basis for contention was typically the amount of restitution to be paid to the claimant
and the sole method for resolving the dispute was the negotiated consensus of the parties: no member
of the tribe would presume to impose a solution and individuals were simply not conceived of as pos-
sessing adjudicatory powers. See Costello, supra note 5, at 878 (noting that while most disputes were
resolved with symbolic economic exchange unrelated to market values, serious disputes threatened to
disrupt the life of the entire tribe; to resolve such controversies required either the interposition of
family members or the assistance of "peacemakers" who relied upon their position as respected elders
to offer moral exhortation derived from community values and legendary histories geared toward
mediating intragroup hostility and re-establishing communal consensus). In sum, underpinning the
traditional Indian dispute resolution model was the notion that indigenous communities were organic.
These communities horizontally constituted egalitarian entities bound to coexist with nature or perish.
For the tribe to function, balance and harmony had to govern intra-tribal relationships. In other words,
disputes invariably opened rifts in the tribe and thus required healing as part of their solutions, not only
of the parties directly affected but for the entire tribe qua tribe.
67. See The Honorable Robert Yazzie, "Hozho Nahasdlii"-We are Now in Good Relations:
Navajo Restorative Justice, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 117, 120 (1996) (contrasting European legal systems,
which are vertical in that they are built upon coercive and hierarchical institutions of power managed
by elites, with traditional Indian legal systems that are predicated upon a horizontal scheme built upon
egalitarianism and kinship relations and within which coercion and force are strictly proscribed and
reciprocity in dealings in essential); see also Zuni Cruz, supra note 18, at 595 (distinguishing traditional
indigenous legal systems, which emphasize "accountability, truth, restoration, forgiveness and integra-
tion of the offender back into the community," with adversarial legal systems that stress the right to
remain silent, the placement of the burden of proof on accusers, and removal of wrongdoers from
communities).
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easily observable institutions and written procedures and records within
the traditional tribal system made it easy for the conquerors to reach the
self-serving conclusion that the Indian tribes were without law and
justice. 68 This was a precursor to the eradication of traditional indige-
nous justice and the cultural constituents of Indian tribal justice systems
in favor of the Anglo-European model as a tool of disenfranchisement,
domination, and assimilation.
69
D. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: ENGINE OF DESTRUCTION
Prior to the late eighteenth century, Indian tribes were able to nego-
tiate their relations with European powers from a position of strength,
and tribal dispute resolution was unaffected by the Anglo-European
model even as tribes ceded land to the United States. However, by the
dawn of the nineteenth century the military balance shifted in favor of
the United States and it became possible and practical to silence the com-
peting indigenous legal discourse on the territorial fringe with the domi-
nant jurisprudence of federal Indian law. Federal Indian law, though
tempered by the beneficence of Chief Justice Marshall, remains "inex-
tricably rooted in colonial notions that are simply inconsistent with any
plausible contemporary normative universe." 70 Individual statutes and
treaties, many of which were procured by fraud and duress, 7 1 provided
for piecemeal federal prosecution of crimes by Indians, but in 1817
Congress extended the web of federal jurisdiction to crimes committed
on reservations by non-Indians. 72
In the 1830s the Supreme Court established that Indian tribes were
nothing more than "domestic dependent nations" under the "tutelage"
of the United States, which, as their trustee, 73 was obligated to take
68. See Zion & Yazzie, supra note 43, at 56-57 (offering an enriched account of the historical
basis for the ancient international practice of recognizing the validity and legitimacy of indigenous law
and of allowing distinct peoples to be governed by their own law); see also ICCPR, supra note 27, art.
27, at 56 (guaranteeing the right of persons belonging to ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities to
"enjoy their own culture" and the right to "preservation of customs and legal traditions").
69. See Porter, supra note 21, at 254 (noting that only after discrediting the very different
indigenous regime of property rights as unworthy of respect, could Euro-American colonizers legally
ratify expropriation of Indian land and displace Indian culture, to include indigenous methods of
dispute resolution, without moral reprobation). Social Darwinism eventually made major theoretical
contributions to ethnocentric biases later confirmed by Western predominance over indigenous legal
systems.
70. Frickey, supra note 25, at 1779.
71. See FRANciS P. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN T REATiEs: THE HISTORY OF A PoLmcAL ANOMOLY 1
(1994).
72. See Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383 (considerably revised and codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1152 (1994)). Nevertheless, crimes committed by Indians against other Indians were as yet
reserved to exclusive tribal jurisdiction.
73. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (holding that "it may well be
doubted whether... tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can,
with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly... be denominated
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affirmative steps to'provide for their maintenance under what came to be
known as the "trust responsibility." Thus, the door was open to further
reduction in tribal sovereignty. By the time the smoke of the last of the
Indian Wars cleared, an organized and concerted drive, led by a constel-
lation of religious organizations, "friends of the Indian," the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, and others endowed with a mission civilisatrice,74 called
upon Congress to extend the coercive power of the entire body of
federal criminal law to the reservations. As Secretary of the Interior Carl
Schurz put it in an 1879 report to that body, the theory was that "[ilf the
Indians are to be advanced in civilized habits it is essential that they be
accustomed to the government of law, with the restraints it imposes and
the protection it affords."7 5
E. CROW DOG: BEGINNING OF THE END OF INDIGENOUS LEGAL
AUTONOMY
Nevertheless, the right of Indian tribes to operate their own justice
systems and dispute resolution mechanisms was still intact, save for the
removal of virtually all tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians, until the
political aftermath of the 1881 case of Ex parte Crow Dog76 swept away
this remnant of sovereignty. 77 Spotted Tail, an authoritarian Brule Sioux
chief who had staked his political fortunes on the policy of accommoda-
tions with federal authorities, was shot and killed on the reservation by
his subchief and political rival Crow Dog. Crow Dog, in contrast, derived
his allegiance by traditional consensus of those Brule opposed to depen-
dence. The day after the shooting, the tribal council ordered an end to
the trouble and dispatched peacemakers to both families. After a
traditional peacemaking ceremony, the family of Spotted Tail agreed to
accept a payment from Crow Dog of $600, eight horses, and one blanket
to resolve the dispute. 78 Despite the satisfaction of the entire Brule tribe
domestic dependent nations ... in a state of pupilage... look[ing] to our government for protection;
relying upon its kindness and its power; appeal[ing] to it for relief to their wants; and address[ing] the
president as their great father"); see also Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942)
(establishing an explicit treaty-based obligation for the U.S. to uphold treaty obligations and act as
trustee on behalf of Indian tribes).
74. See Sidney L. Harring, Crow Dog's Case: A Chapter in the Legal History of Tribal
Sovereignty, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 191,229 (1989).
75. Id. at 224.
76. 109 U.S. 556 (1883)
77. See Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
78. See Harring, supra note 74, at 205 (citing BLACK HILLs DAILY TIMES (Sept. 16, 1881)).
In the Case of Crow Dog, as in all other offenses of a like nature, the relatives of
the deceased and his own meet together in council, talk the damages over until they
come to some agreement as to what they should be, and have an understanding as to how
much property shall be given to make peace. The pipe of peace and fellowship is then
smoked, and the gifts distributed, and there the matter ends in harmony and
fellowship ....
Harring, supra note 74, at 205 (quoting BLACK HILLs DAILY TIMES (Sept. 16, 1881)).
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and the significant doubts as to whether the killing had occurred in self-
defense or in cold blood,79 the case presented the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) and the Justice Department the pretext they sought for
extension of federal criminal law to Indians. 8 0 Crow Dog was arrested
and sent for trial in the Territorial Court of South Dakota, where he was
sentenced to hang by an all-white, anti-Indian jury.
81
However, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the conviction. The
Court found the Brule to be entitled to self-determination, at least to the
extent of the preeminent right to exercise their own methods, without
U.S. interference, 82 to resolve disputes wholly internal to the tribe:
The pledge to secure these people, with whom the United States
was contracting as a distinct political body, an orderly govern-
ment, by appropriate legislation thereafter to be framed and
enacted, necessarily implies, having regard to all the circum-
stances attending the transaction, that among the arts of
civilized life, which it was the very purpose of all these arrange-
ments to introduce and naturalize among them, was the highest
and best of all, that of self-government, the regulation by them-
selves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order
and peace among their own members by the administration of
their own laws and customs. 83
Lest its finding be misconstrued, the Court elaborated upon its defense
of the sovereign right of Indian tribes to employ traditional Indian
dispute resolution in tribal matters, holding that it would be unjust in the
case at bar to extend U.S. law:
Over aliens and strangers; over the members of, a community,
separated by race, by tradition, by the instincts of a free though
savage life, from the authority and power which seeks to
impose upon them the restraints of an external and unknown
code, and to subject them to the responsibilities of civil con-
duct, according to rules and penalties of which they could have
no previous warning; which judges them by a standard made
by others and not for them, which takes no account of the
79. See Hatting, supra note 74, at 199.
80. See Harring, supra note 74, at 200-01. According to Harring, evidence indicates that briefs
and legal theories suggesting the extension of federal criminal law to crimes committed by Indians
against Indians had been developed in advance, and the U.S. Attorney General was simply waiting for
a fortuitous test case. See Harring, supra note 74, at 200-01.
81. See Harring, supra note 74, at 204-12.
82. See FEaix S. CoHEN, HnmaOK oFFEDERAu INAN LAW 236 (1982) (citing Exparte Crow
Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568 (1883)).
83. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 567-68.
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conditions which should except them from its exactions, and
makes no allowance for their inability to understand it. It tries
them not by their peers, nor by the custom of their people, nor
the law of their land, but by superiors of a different race,
according to the law of a social state of which they have an
imperfect conception, and which is opposed to the traditions of
their history, to the habits of their lives, to the strongest
prejudices of their savage nature; one which measures the red
man's revenge by the maxims of the white man's morality.
8 4
Despite this pronouncement, and notwithstanding the restoration of
Brule tribal harmony, for the white majority, Crow Dog constituted a
"legal atrocity," because an Indian killer had "escaped punishment." 85
U.S. Representative Cutcheon of Michigan pronounced this sentiment
before the Indian Affairs Committee in presenting a bill in 1884:
I believe we all feel that an Indian, when he commits a crime,
should be recognized as a criminal, and so treated under the
laws of the land. I do not believe we shall ever succeed in
civilizing the Indian race until we teach them regard for the
law, and show them that they are not only responsible to the
law but amenable to its penalties.
It is an infamy upon our civilization, a disgrace to this
nation, that there should be anywhere within its boundaries a
body of people who can, with absolute impunity, commit the
crime of murder, there being no tribunal before which they can
be brought for punishment. Under our present law there is no
penalty that can be inflicted except according to the custom of
the tribe, which is simply that the "blood avenger"-that is,
the next of kin of the person murdered-shall pursue the one
who has been guilty of the crime and commit a new murder
upon him.8 6
Determined to rectify the barbarous, "savage quality" of tribal law
and mollify public fervor, Congress applied "white man's morality" to
extend federal criminal jurisdiction and make murder of an Indian by an
Indian a federal crime punishable in federal court.8 7 This was accom-
plished through the Major Crimes Act of 1885,88 which expressly
84. Id. at 571.
85. Harring, supra note 74, at 191, 194.
86. 16 CoNG. Rac. 934 (1885).
87. See ROBERT N. C1NON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAw 36-38 (3d ed. 1991).
88. Major Crimes Act of 1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1153 (1994) and expanded to 14 felonies from the original seven).
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reconfigured the legal basis for recognition of tribal sovereignty by pro-
viding for concurrent federal jurisdiction over major felonies committed
by Indians on reservations regardless of the status of their victims.
89
Although legal challenges to the Major Crimes Act were swift in
coming, the political climate for the erosion of the last vestiges of tribal
sovereignty was too friendly for the Court to ignore. In United States v.
Kagama,90 an Indian man challenged the constitutionality of the Major
Crimes Act claiming that his murdering of another Indian on a reserva-
tion was a matter not for U.S. but for tribal jurisdiction. The Court ruled
that Congress had an "incontrovertible right" under the judicially
discovered doctrine of "plenary power" to exercise its authority over
Indians as it saw fit, for their own "well-being." The Court stated Con-
gress and the tribes were in a guardian-ward relationship and Indians
were dependent on the United States for their political rights and thus
were without legal recourse.91
In the wake of Kagama, the three branches of federal government
conspired to develop the plenary power doctrine.92 They also crafted a
broad assimilationist policy to include the passage of over five thousand
laws regulating Indian tribes93 and ultimately weakened "traditional
relationships, involving marriage, family and clan relationships, the
distribution of property, and social and political organization." 94
89. The Major Crimes Act states in pertinent part the following:
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other
person any of the following offenses, namely murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maim-
ing, a felony under chapter 109A [rape and related offenses], incest, assault with intent
to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily
injury, . . . an assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years,
arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within the Indian
country, shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing
any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
(b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a) of this section that is not defined and
punished by Federal law in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States
shall be defined and punished in accordance with the laws of the State in which such
offense was committed as are in force at the time of such offense.
18 U.S.C. § 1153.
90. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
91. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82, 384 (1886).
92. See Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 219-22 (1984) (describing interbranch cooperation in domesticating Indian
law).
93. See Laura Nader & Jay Ou, Idealization and Power: Legality and Tradition in Native
American Law, 23 OKLA. Crr U. L. REv. 13, 19 n.26 (1998).
94. Harring, supra note 74, at 194.
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F. INSTITUTIONAL CAPITULATION: COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, CODES,
CRIMINAL "JUSTICE"
Capitalizing further upon the judicially sanctioned erosion of tribal
culture and sovereignty, Congress, in the 1890s, delegated power to the
BIA to develop Courts of Indian Offenses (CIO). These courts were
empowered to enforce stringent social control mechanisms with the
purpose of extinguishing tribal legal systems and to force assimilation
by punishing traditional modes of behavior and expression that were in
contrast to Western culture. In arguing before Congress for the
eradication of the practices of Indian religion, dancing, and feasting,
Secretary of the Interior Henry M. Teller proclaimed that:
If it is the purpose of the Government to civilize the Indians,
they must be compelled to desist from the savage and bar-
barous practices that are calculated to continue them in
savagery, no matter what exterior influences are brought to
bear on them ... Every man familiar with Indian life will bear
witness to the pernicious influence of these savage rites and
heathenish customs. 95
By 1892 the BIA Commissioner had listed the following offenses as
within the jurisdiction of the Courts of Indian Offenses: "participating in
dances or feasts, entering into plural . . . marriages, acting as medicine
men [i.e., practicing Indian religion], destroying property of other In-
dians, engaging in immorality, [and] intoxication." 96 By 1900 CIO/CFR
Courts, as they were commonly called, had been created on the majority
of reservations. 97 Judges were chosen from the ranks of the more
"assimilated" Indians who were willing to cut their hair, wear western
attire, and accept individual land allotments carved from the tribal land
mass 98 under the Dawes Act.99
With federal jurisdiction having replaced tribal legal systems and
Indian culture effectively criminalized, the next logical step was to im-
pose the Anglo-European adversarial legal system in the stead of tradi-
tional Indian restorative legal systems. Congress accomplished this in
1934 with the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA).IO0 Although the IRA
expressly recognized that tribes might create their own courts and enact
95. Newton, supra note 29, at 1033.
96. Newton, supra note 29, at 1033.
97. See Newton, supra note 29, at 1034.
98. See Seielstad, supra note 8, at 139 n.28.
99. See General Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act) ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388.
100. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 461-479 (1994)).
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their own laws, 1Ol the new legislation required tribes to accept boilerplate
constitutions. This boilerplate language forced the "fragmentation and
compartmentalization of [what remained essentially 'Indian' in] tribal
affairs into a sort of constitutional 'box,' leaving behind a vast array of
social, political, and spiritual elements traditionally associated with indige-
nous governance." Although the tenor of the IRA and subsequent
federal policies appeared to suggest an attempt to encourage tribal
self-determination in the administration of the tribal judicial process, the
tribal courts created under the IRA were nothing more than revamped
CIO/CFR Courts. These newly created courts followed the federal pat-
tern even more closely, with American substantive law governing the
judicial process' 0 2 and bearing a regime of individual rights drawn
almost exclusively from an atomistic strain of Anglo-American juris-
prudence and largely hostile to the communal notions of justice inherent
in traditional Indian legal systems.
Moreover, after the passage of Public Law 280 in 1954,103
providing that any state could unilaterally elect to accept jurisdiction
over the Indian territory located within its borders and establish a system
of concurrent jurisdiction, the entire body of state civil and criminal law
was extended to cases involving Indians. Out of fear that failure to
create acceptable tribal courts would result in states assuming jurisdiction
over all cases occurring on reservations, 104 and out of the understanding
that review of Congressional exercises of regulatory jurisdiction over
Indian affairs was an exercise in futility,105 the tribes, one after another,
begrudgingly acceded to federal and state policies of forced assimilation
and implemented constitutions, tribal courts, and adversarial-based
justice systems. 106
The penultimate blow to Indian legal systems and traditional modes
of dispute resolution fell in 1968 with the Indian Civil Rights Act, 0 7
101. See 25 C.F.R. § 11.100(c) (1997).
102. Porter, supra note 21, at 269-70.
103. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994)
& 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994)).
104. See Costello, supra note 5, at 896 (stating that the Navajo Tribal Courts were created to
prevent state court jurisdiction over the Navajo nation).
105. See Nader & Ou, supra note 93, at 19 n.26.
106. See COHEN, supra note 82, at 332-35 (providing a detailed account of the role of the United
States in the development of tribal courts).
107. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA), Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (codified as amend-
ed at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1994)). The ICRA provides that No Indian tribe in exercising powers
of self-government shall, among other things:
1. violate freedom from unreasonable search and seizures, or issue warrants without probable
cause;
2. subject any person to prosecution more than once for the same offense;
3. compel any person to testify against himself in a criminal case;
4. deny the rights to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the charges, to confront
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which imposed many of the individualist strictures of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, and in particular the Bill of Rights, on tribal governments,1 08 and
further circumscribed the jurisdiction and autonomy of tribal courts to
smooth the way for what many Indian activists branded "white-man's
justice."109 The ICRA was propounded by its sponsors as an instrument
designed to aid the tribes in establishing "meaningful self-determina-
tion" consistent with national policy. 110 From the Indian perspective,
the formal jury systemll was foreign to traditional methods of Indian
dispute resolution. Ancient and sacred tribal traditions of fairness and
justice also made the ICRA and its reference to "due process,". "equal
protection," "speedy trial," and "freedom of speech" an unnecessary
and unwelcome intrusion on tribal sovereignty.112
Consistent with the interests of promoting Indian self-determination
Congress left interpretation of the ICRA within the authority of the tribes
and offered the admonition that the purpose of the statute was to protect
individual rights as against the administration of tribal justice without
eroding the parameters of tribal sovereignty. 113 Also, the ICRA did not
provide a remedy in federal court for a tribal member contesting the
legality of his detention by a tribal court, except for a writ of habeas
corpus."14  As Porter noted, the ICRA "significantly altered the
witnesses, to subpoena witnesses, and at one's own expense to be assisted by an attorney in all
criminal cases;
5. require excessive bail, excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual punishment, or impose
punishment greater than imprisonment for one year and a fine of $5,000 or both for conviction
of any one offense;
6. deny equal protection of the laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due
process of law;
7. pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; and deny the right, if accused of an offense
punishable by imprisonment, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.
See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1994).
108. See Donald L. Burnett, Jr., An Historical Analysis of the 1968 "Indian Civil Rights" Act, 9
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 557 (1972).
109. See Porter, supra note 21, at 271-72.
110. See Frank Pommersheim, Liberation, Dreams, and Hard Work: An Essay on Tribal Court
Jurisprudence, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 411, 449 (1992).
111. See, e.g., Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding, that with
respect to criminal law, the ICRA required "a full and fair trial before an impartial tribunal that
conducts the trial upon regular proceedings after proper service or voluntary appearance of the
defendant, and.., no showing of prejudice in the tribal court or in the system of governing laws").
112. Although they embody sets of core Indian cultural values in addition to those structurally
embedded by their federal drafters, the very notion of written tribal constitutions is an imposition upon
tribal sovereignty by a foreign power. See Robert J. McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The
Indian Bill of Rights at Thirty Years, 34 IDAHO L. REv. 465, 494-95 (1998).
113. See Robert Laurence, The Convergence of Cross-Boundary Enforcement Theories in Ameri-
can Indian Law: An Attempt to Reconcile Full Faith and Credit, Comity and Asymmetry, 18 QuINNnc
L. REv. 115 (1998) (suggesting that the legislative history indicates Congress intended the ICRA to be a
compromise statute that would extend American constitutional norms to tribes while preventing those
norms from significantly disrupting tribal culture, particularly as the consequence of persistent
external judicial influence and particularly after the amendments in 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303).
Nevertheless, it is debatable whether the judiciary has faithfully discharged Congressional intent as
per the ICRA.
114. "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person, in a court of
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focus ...away from the tribal community towards the individual ...
under the guise of strengthening tribal governance."115
By the early 1970s, the centuries-long U.S. assault on tribal legal
systems and the Indian culture in which they were so deeply rooted, had
disrupted and almost entirely displaced traditional methods of social
control in favor of the tribal courts.11 6 Reliance upon the selfish
individualist Anglo-American adversarial legal system as the more
"civilized" approach to dispute resolution almost entirely displaced
pre-Columbian tribal legal and cultural norms of nonconfrontationalism
and harmony restoration and acquired tenure in Indian country.
BIA-drafted tribal codes permitted tribal court judges to apply tribal
statutes. But, federal and state laws were supreme,1 17 even where they
were clearly unsuitable for the tribal context or where they did not
resonate with tribal values. Federal judicial review steered tribal court
jurisprudence into lockstep conformity with the U.S. legal system. 118
Unsurprisingly, individual reliance on foreign legal concepts and foreign
legal advocacy removed Indian disputes from their natural contexts1 19
and soon produced increased and unresolvable acrimony in reservation
communities now shorn of more flexible systems of community dispute
resolution.120 With tribal courts and tribal governments increasingly re-
vealed as little more than illegitimate and unjust appendages serving the
interests of the American hegemon, enforcement of judgments became
the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian tribe." 25 U.S.C. § 1303
(1994). Nevertheless, there is little litigation in federal or tribal courts concerning issues of excessive
punishment; according to Robert McCarthy, it is possible that only "orders of permanent banishment
from the reservation may constitute restraints on liberty sufficiently severe to satisfy the jurisdictional
prerequisites for the ICRA's habeas corpus relief in federal court." McCarthy, supra note 112, at 474.
115. Porter, supra note 21, at 272.
116. See Newton, supra note 29, at 1037; see also Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982
Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HAav. L. REV. 4, 40 (1983) (establishing the thesis that
U.S. courts are "jurispathic" in that they destroy law generated by interpretative communities such as
Indian tribal courts, which are "jurisgenerative").
117. See Freshman, supra note 1, at 1751 (noting that federal regulations and tribal statutes re-
quire tribal courts to "look first to potentially applicable federal law of the United States before
seeking to apply tribal law").
118. See Newton, supra note 29, at 1038.
119. See Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Ad-
versary Culture, 15 L. & Soc'y REV. 525, 526 (1980-81) (constructing the notion of "natural contexts"
for particular types of disputes); see also Philmer Bluehouse & James W. Zion, Hozhooji Naat'aanii:
The Navajo Justice and Harmony Ceremony, 10 MEDIATION Q. 327, 335 (1993) (emphasizing that in
many tribal courts individual criminal acts are punished without any effort made to undertake
communal restoration).
120. See Haberfeld & Townsend, supra note 53, at 409 (noting that by the 1970s Indian tribes
were split into contending camps of traditionalists, who opposed violating the sanctity of tribal lands
through extractive commercial development, and hypercompetitive modernists, who supported exploit-
ing collective tribal resources for commercial development and personal advancement in terms of
jobs, income, status, and power); see also Zuni Cruz, supra note 18, at 596 (describing how the adver-
sarial system employed by tribal courts, by placing a high value on protecting the individual from the
excesses of the collective, compounded these tribal rifts to the benefit of a handful of self-centered
elites and to the detriment of the traditional mutually beneficial relationship between the individual and
the tribe).
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far more difficult than under the ancien regime,121 which furthered the
detriment of harmonious communal social organization.122 Although
the process of colonization had nearly been completed, a new generation
of critical legal jurisprudence influenced by the Civil Rights Movement
began to question the foundations and institutions of federal Indian
law,1 23 thereby beginning the long and daunting task of reclaiming
Indian sovereignty by recapturing tribal legal autonomy. 124
III. BACK TO THE FUTURE: INDIAN TRIBAL PEACEMAKING AS
APPROPRIATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. TRIBAL COURTS LAUNCH THE RESISTANCE
The climate for ventures geared toward reclaiming Indian sovereign-
ty by recapturing tribal legal autonomy was not hospitable, despite the
official U.S. proclamation of the Era of Indian Self-Determination. In
1970, public opinion and federal policies remained ambivalent at best,
regarding the exercise of Indian rights. The Rehnquist Court further
restricted tribal court jurisdiction-already limited to civil and minor
criminal matters occurring on the reservation provided the state did not
elect to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction125-to consenting tribal
members on those parcels of the reservation central to tribal governance.
The Court also called into question the very rationality and legitimacy,
not only of the link between Indian territory and sovereignty,126 but of
the capacity of traditional Indian legal systems and tribal courts to
exercise independent, sound judgment.1 27 Nevertheless, despite the
121. See Newton, supra note 29, at 1036-37.
122. See Porter, supra note 21, at 277-81 (arguing that the adoption of litigation as the sole or pri-
mary means of resolving interpersonal conflict pushed individual tribal members to focus exclusively
on the vindication of their individual rights, thereby marginalizing their relationships to each other and
their tribes). By the 1970s, indigenous people were frequently subject to the coercive sanctions of
externally-imposed methods and institutions of justice, a fact reflected most alarmingly in increased
rates of incarceration and other coercive contacts with the criminal justice system.
123. See Newton, supra note 29, at 1036.
124. See Seielstad, supra note 8, at 139 (positing that legal assimilation, a precursor to more
general assimilation, could potentially herald the extinction of Indian tribal societies).
125. States may elect to exercise their concurrent jurisdiction despite the pendency or conclusion
of a tribal court proceeding and thus subject Indian defendants to twice the chance of conviction and
half the chance of escaping punishment without violating either the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution, state constitutions, or the common law doctrine of resjudicata. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(1994) (giving states concurrent jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed by or against Indians);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994) (giving states concurrent jurisdiction in civil actions where Indians
are parties).
126. See Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian Tri-
bal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court's Changing Vision, 55 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 4 (1993) (noting that
Indian territorial sovereignty, as with the sovereignty of other peoples, has traditionally been consid-
ered to connote the authority of a recognized government over a geographical region and the people
living within it).
127. In 1981, the Court held that non-Indian hunters and fishermen on non-Indian fee land, even
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radically diminished territorial conception of tribal judicial sovereignty,
traditional mechanisms for keeping the peace still existed along with
established centers of authority despite the best efforts of the federal and
state governments.
By the mid-1970s, several tribal courts were quietly rebuilding their
institutional legitimacy by rediscovering and applying tribal customary
law.128 Some tribes, such as the Navajo, were openly according "custom
and tradition the highest priority in [the] choice of substantive law." 1
29
Also, a number of tribal codes were making explicit provisions for
informal dispute resolution processes "aimed at working out the dispute
in the Indian way."130
B. ALLIES IN ADR: MAJORITARIAN CRITICS OF THE ADVERSARIAL
SYSTEM
The renaissance of tribal legal systems gathered steam in the late
1970s when an emerging body of scholarly workl 3l bolstered the Indian
perception that the adversarial model of justice was ill-tailored to the
resolution of many types of disputes.132 The field of Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR) promised "to release us from some-if not all-of
the limitations and rigidities of law and formal legal institutions . ." 133
Despite its reformative contributions, standard modes of ADR, such as
arbitration and mediation, 134 were inappropriate to the resolution of
Indian intratribal disputes, and to the resurrection of traditional Indian
legal systems. Moreover, rather than force upon tribal societies "alter-
native dispute resolution" techniques borrowed from a culturally neutral
within boundaries of a reservation, do not enter any agreements or dealings with the Indian tribes so as
to subject themselves to tribal civil jurisdiction, thereby extending the exclusion of tribal sovereignty
over non-Indians on reservation land from criminal to civil subject matter, on the ground that such
non-Indian hunting and fishing did not so threaten tribal political or economic security as to justify
tribal regulation. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981). In 1990 the Court denied
tribal court jurisdiction over the crimes of non-member Indians committed on the reservation on the
grounds that tribal courts, while they "include many familiar features of the judicial process, . . . are
influenced by the unique customs, languages, the usages of the tribes they serve," thereby implying
inferiority and incapacity to extend due process to anyone but tribal members. Duro v. Reina, 495
U.S. 676, 693 (1990). The Court went on to hold that "[t]he retained sovereignty of the tribe is but a
recognition of certain additional authority the tribes maintain over Indians who consent to be tribal
members." Id.
128. See Newton, supra note 29, at 1038; see also FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS:
AMERICAN I NDiAN LAW AND ComNEpORARY TRIBAL LIFE 61-79 (1995) (providing background on tribal
courts and explaining the importance of contextual legitimacy); VINE DELORIA & CLUTFORD M. LYTLE,
AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JusTIcE 110-36 (1983) (discussing the evolution of tribal justice systems).
129. Seielstad, supra note 8, at 140.
130. Newton, supra note 29, at 1048 n.175.
131. See Haberfeld & Townsend, supra note 53 (summarizing early criticism of the adversarial
justice paradigm as applied to the resolution of Indian disputes).
132. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359, 1366-67.
133. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation
Co-Opted or "The Law ofADR," 19 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1, 1 (1991).
134. See Costello, supra note 5, at 899.
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non-Indian context, legal reformers suggested that contemporary Indian
dispute resolution methods should be rediscovered and tailored to the
more multi-faceted cultural processes and complex social arrangements
that characterize each distinct reservation setting. 135 As Zion and Yazzie
contended, "traditional justice is not 'alternative dispute resolution,' but
[our] original dispute resolution [which] . . . continue[s] to be a viable
method of law and justice . . . [and] a legitimate means of
self-governance."1 36
C. TRIBAL PEACEMAKING: THE INDIAN LEGAL MANIFESTO
1. Contemporary Origins
Thus, although ADR theorists and practitioners could not displace a
framework of justice precluding culturally and substantively appropriate
solutions to Indian intratribal disputes, the advent of ADR invigorated
Indian legal activists. The "Tribal Peacemaking" (TPM) concept was
defined by Bernard as "any system of dispute resolution used within a
Native American community which utilizes non-adversarial strategies...
[and] incorporates some traditional or customary approaches ... the aim
of which is conciliation and the restoration of peace and harmony."1 37
TMP reawakened the spirit of traditional Indian dispute resolution at
the 1985 First Tribal Peacemaking Conference in Seattle. 138 Presently,
after more than a decade of theoretical revision and refinement in
135. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 133, at 6.
136. Zion & Yazzie, supra note 43, at 55-56. By the early 1980s concern for the potential of
race-, gender-, and ethnic-based societal discrimination to intrude into informal dispute resolution
processes triggered empirical analysis. Two scholars demonstrated that individuals and groups with
lesser social power, primarily nonwhites and women, fared comparatively more poorly in ADR than
their white and male counterparts, and more poorly in ADR than in litigation, despite the expectations
of ADR advocates. See Gary LaFree & Christine Rack, The Effects of Participants' Ethnicity and
Gender on Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 L. & Soc'y Rev. 767,
769 (1996); see also Jeanne M. Brett et al., Culture and Joint Gains in Negotiation, 14 NEGOTIATION J.
61 (1998) (presenting the associative influence of culture as an independent variable in explaining and
predicting disparate outcomes for minorities as contrasted with majorities); Grillo, supra note 16, at
1549 (questioning whether ADR impinges the political and legal autonomy of disenfranchised minority
groups and suggesting that formal adjudication with judicial oversight and interposition may provide
safeguards against the exposition of disabling racial and cultural animus); Delgado et al., supra note
132, at 1363, 1394 (castigating ADR, for failing to consider unequal distributions of power, enhancing
social control by ignoring structured social inequalities themselves productive of disputes, and refusing
concentration on the disputes of those who had confronted legal authority or defied legal norms).
Indian legal scholar-activists joined in the condemnation of ADR as a "pacification plan to stem the
[Indian] rights movement" and steer Indian claims they contended were treated along with domestic
conflicts, consumer cases, and civil rights issues as "garbage cases" away from federal courts into
medication where could be dealt. Nader & Ou, supra note 93, at 27. Meanwhile, for Indian litigants,
the solution was not to revisit the adversarial model but to awaken dormant methods of Indian dispute
resolution. See Zion & Yazzie, supra note 43, at 55-56.
137. Phyllis E. Bernard, Community and Conscience: The Dynamic Challenge of Lawyers' Ethics
in Tribal Peacemaking, 27 U. TOL. L. RE,. 821, 835 (1996).
138. See LeResche, supra note 63, at 323.
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professional networks and national conferences, TPM, a "rediscovered
method of Indian dispute resolution," 139 has wended its way into hun-
dreds of tribal court systems. TPM carries with it the expectation that, by
wedding ancient and abiding Indian values to dispute resolution tech-
niques appropriate to the modem pluralist context in which tribes now
are situated,m40 it can better secure community health than have alien
methods of dispute resolution. 141
2. Theoretical Description
Rather than mediation with an Indian twist, TPM is the ideal-typic
form of horizontal justice.142 It publicly and ceremonially deploys spiri-
tual, non-legal norms and collected tribal wisdom; invokes the connected-
ness of all things; listens deeply to the widest possible circle of people;
speaks compassionately to their hearts to remind them of their relational
and cooperational obligations to be unselfish to one another; 143 and
seeks to heal hurts and wounds old and new. At the same time TPM
seeks to balance the intellectual, emotional, and physical dimensions of
not simply the disputants but the entire tribe which it guides on a jour-
ney to restoration. 144 In this restoration, TPM recognizes no separation
of the religious and the secular, and supernatural power can be directed
to remove or overcome sources of disharmony and reestablish order.145
For obvious reasons TPM is not typically employed in disputes involving
non-Indians and is rarely used in disputes between members of different
tribes.146 Within a single tribe, however, TPM is frequently limited to the
139. LeResche, supra note 63, at 322.
140. See Haberfeld & Townsend, supra note 53, at 419. It is important to stress yet again that the
particular dispute resolution methods employed by any particular Indian tribe are distinct as from
every other Indian tribe in that they are the experiential products of the unique culture, history, and
wisdom of that tribe as it has evolved over time. Thus, while it is possible to speak in general terms
when describing TPM in the theoretical abstract, a mature and enriched understanding of TPM in
practice can only be acquired by a tribe-specific inquiry which is sensitive to intertribal difference as
well as similarity and which avoids the pitfalls of overgeneralization.
141. See Costello, supra note 5, at 888 (suggesting that whereas adversarial methods of dispute
resolution compromise the spiritual, emotional, mental, and physical health of the Indian community by
pitting individuals and groups against each other, tradition-and nonadversarial-methods of dispute
resolution are reconstitutive and restorative of communal harmony and thus communal health).
142. See Bluehouse & Zion, supra note 119, at 336.
143. See LeResche, supra note 63, at 321.
144. See LeResche, supra note 63, at 321-22.
145. See Bluehouse & Zion, supra note 119, at 332.
146. See Michael D. Lieder, Navajo Dispute Resolution and Promissory Obligations: Continuity
and Change in The Largest Native American Nation, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 16 (1993) (noting that
where outsiders are involved in disputes with members of Indian tribes, particularly where physical
injuries are involved, the absence of the common ties of kinship, religion, community, and ethos that
drive the process of Indian dispute resolution and encourage parties to remove the conflict from the
adversarial plane in the interests of tribal health and harmony would tend to preclude the success of
such an enterprise under such circumstances); see also Daniel W. Van Ness & Pat Nolan, Legislating
for Restorative Justice, 10 REG. U. L. REV. 53, 53 (1998) (noting that while elements of TPM, termed
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resolution of domestic disputes.147 In certain tribal jurisdictions, it is the
method used to resolve even criminal offenses as serious as robbery,
rape, and even murder. 148
3. Parties, Procedures, Process, Remedies
In more practical terms, TPM reflects the interests of the Indian
parties against the backdrop of tribal norms where subtle and not-so-
subtle behavior-altering mechanisms-anger, shame, 149 embarrassment,
and encouragement-are freely allowed to modify previously-held
negotiating positions150 and guide the parties toward harmony. Neither
lawyers nor judges are permitted to be present. All those who know the
parties or are familiar with the history of the problem are required to
attend and to sit together in a circle.' 5 '
The procedure, always conducted orally,152 is supervised by a
"peacemaker" who has gained the respect and trust of tribal members
by living a long and exemplary life in spiritual and temporal terms. 153
Nevertheless, the "peacemaker" has merely persuasive rather than com-
pulsory powers to guide the disputants. The obligation of the peace-
maker does not officially extend further than inducing people to talk to
one another by speaking and thinking well and exemplifying tribal
values and ways.154 The peacemaker is not a neutral party: he or she
has the respect of the parties, who are frequently related to him or her by
"restorative justice," have been introduced into non-Indian systems and contexts such as family group
conferences, cases involving "community injury," and victim/offender mediation, these efforts have
not met with anticipated success, largely because urbanized and atomized settings do not offer the
"spiritual glue" or the pull of communal obligations to condition individual conduct). In essence, so
central to the successful functioning of TPM is the commitment to shared tribal values and
responsibilities the extension of TPM beyond the boundaries of the reservation or beyond the subject
matter of disputes between tribal members is inherently problematic; TPM cannot always be expected
to succeed in cases where an outsider is involved in a dispute with a tribal member, particularly where
a physical injury occurs. This particular scenario, which reveals the potential limitations as well as the
future possibilities of TPM, is discussed extensively infra in Part IV.
147. See Bernard, supra note 137, at 833-34.
148. See Lieder, supra note 146, at 17-18.
149. See Carole E. Goldberg, Overextended Borrowing: Tribal Peacemaking Applied in Non-
Indian Disputes, 72 WASH. L. REV. 1003, 1015 (1997) (describing how, within the tightly inter-
connected tribe, the technique of shaming-calling down personal criticism upon one who deviates
from group norms-can, although it does not force a person to conform, induce those who wish to
remain accepted within the tribe to modify their contrarian positions in order to bring themselves into a
state of harmony with others).
150. See Porter, supra note 21, at 253.
151. See Bernard, supra note 137, at 830.
152. See Porter, supra note 21, at 253.
153. See LeResche, supra note 63, at 321 (demonstrating that one of the most important criteria
in the selection of "leaders" of traditional Indian tribal societies was skill in mediating intragroup
hostility). Research concerning the legal systems of other tribal peoples suggests that selection as
leaders of those with skill in dispute resolution may be a common characteristic of this level of
sociopolitical organization. See, e.g., Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 4, at 352-53 (noting that the main
criteria for chiefdom among the Roma is "intelligence and a sense of fairness" in resolving group
disputes).
154. See Costello, supra note 5, at 887.
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blood or marriage. 155 Thus, the parties are strongly inclined to follow
proffered "guidance."1 56 The guidance typically encourages people to
live up to their communal responsibilities, requests apologies, suggests
means and amounts of restitution, 157 and ensures that all parties depart
"with their tails up [rather than with one] with a tail up, one with a tail
down."158
The peacemaker typically enters the center of the circle to lead a
prayer summoning the aid of the supernatural 159 and to frame the atti-
tudes and relationships of the parties. The peacemaker then listens to all
interested persons from their subjective points of view1 60 in order to
determine the reasons for the state of disharmony.16 1 In this open, loose-
ly structured discussion, feelings and emotions are recognized as equally
important to reason, 162 and all persons, though they are offered emo-
tional support along the way, 163 are required to directly confront the full
consequences of their actions, including the injustice done and the
155. See Bluehouse & Zion, supra note 119, at 329 (explaining that the "core of common law" of
most Indian legal systems is the "lineage system," a method of tracing relationships and adjusting dis-
putes between people with the assistance and intervention of clan and family members whose influ-
ence with their blood relatives constituted a form of "ingrained emotional cement." Thus, in
traditional Indian dispute resolution, as well as contemporary TPM, the peacemaker is often a blood
relative of one or both of the immediate parties). Several tribal codes, such as the Navajo Code of
Judicial Conduct (1991), explicitly state that peacemakers in TPM may be related to parties by blood
or clan. See Bluehouse & Zion, supra note 119, at 334.
156. See Bluehouse & Zion, supra note 119, at 332. For the peacemaker in TPM there is an ex-
plicit stress upon an affirmative and interventionist role in maneuvering the parties back into harmony
by way of reference to traditional values. In the language of mainstream ADR, the TPM peacemaker
can be cast as a directive and activist mediator whose expertise in the particular substantive domain in
which the dispute occurs permits him to thrust himself forcefully into the conflict and make judicious
use of persuasion, influence, and judgments to achieve the concrete settlement of an otherwise elusive
problem. Nevertheless, TPM is neither mediation nor arbitration as understood by the Western mind
as such terms do not capture the inherently spiritual, communal, and restorative essence of TPM. See
Bluehouse & Zion, supra note 119, at 335.
157. See Roback, supra note 54, at 35 (noting that TPM almost never offers the guilt of the
accused as the "question presented"; rather, the gap separating parties and damaging tribal harmony is
generally the amount of restitution, either material or services, to be paid to resolve the dispute, and
this amount is the subject of bargaining, negotiation, and intervention by the peacemaker).
158. LeResche, supra note 63, at 322.
159. In the horizontal model of dispute resolution employed by many traditional Indian tribal
societies every person sitting in the circle would focus upon the center of the circle where the peace-
maker would move the dispute from the circumference to the center so that all four quadrants
(spiritual, emotional, physical, and intellectual) would reenter a balance and recomprise a united
whole. For a description of this process, see Costello, supra note 5, at 888.
160. See Mark J. Wolff, Spirituality, Culture and Tradition: An Introduction to the Role of Tribal
Courts and Councils in Reclaiming Native American Heritage and Sovereignty, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
761, 762 (1995) (noting that the subjective, as well as the objective, is within the purview of tribal
peacemaking).
161. See Bluehouse & Zion, supra note 119, at 330.
162. See Costello, supra note 5, at 898.
163. See Zion & Yazzie, supra note 43, at 83.
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resultant harm.164 Emphasizing future relations rather than the legal
consequences of past events,165 the peacemaker then (1) presents a
lecture on how or why the parties have violated tribal values and
breached tribal solidarity,1 66 (2) leads a precise discussion of practical
means whereby the parties can end the present dispute, and (3) suggests
in some detail how all can conform their future conduct to tribal values
reflective of their relational aspects as well as of the tribal right to justice
and harmony. 167
4. "Enforcement"
TPM is decidedly nonpunitive in its philosophical underpinnings
and restorative functions. In contrast to state adjudication, no central
authority can directly apply coercion to enforce the will of the collective
and restore harmony. Remedies mutually agreed upon in TPM cere-
monies are generally implemented without resistance and without resort
to the traditional instruments of the penal system, even in cases concern-
ing conduct that would be characterized as criminal in the mainstream
justice system for four primary reasons. First, as agreements reached in
TPM are the product of a consensus that includes the wrongdoer(s), the
personal honor and communal obligation of the wrongdoer(s) are pre-
enlisted in support of compliance.1 68 By the same token, TPM enlists
extended family and friends as "probation officers" for the wrongdoer
and confers upon them a "responsibility to the victims and communities
164.
[TPM] addresses denial, minimalization and externalization in ways that [mainstream]
systems cannot do. In a given [mainstream] system, proving the facts of a case is diffi-
cult and burdensome. In criminal systems with the privilege against self-incrimination,
defendants cannot be compelled to discuss motives, attitudes, addictions or causes of
misconduct. In [TPM], which does not utilize punishment, people are free to "talk out"
the problem fully and get at the psychological barriers which impede a practical solution.
Zion & Yazzie, supra note 43, at 81.
165. See Costello, supra note 5, at 899.
166. See Zuni Cruz, supra note 18, at 581-82. To Zuni Cruz, breaches of tribal solidarity are
generally occasioned by individuals who either place greater emphasis upon their individual needs and
desires than they do upon the interests of the tribe or who make personal choices which affect the
community in deleterious fashion. See Zuni Cruz, supra note 18, at 581.
167. See Porter, supra note 21, at 251-54 (discussing elements of peacemaking). Tribal peace-
making amongst the Roma people, known colloquially as Gypsies, is similar with regard to the central
and activist role of the peacemaker in shaping the resolution of intratribal disputes in such a fashion as
to affirmatively restore tribal harmony. See Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 4, at 354-57 (identifying the
concepts of horizontalism, egalitarianism, and voluntary deference to peacemakers as representative
of communal values and will, supernatural supervision of dispute resolution, and communal restoration
as elements of Roma dispute resolution as well).
168. See Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving
Compliance Through Consent, 18 L. & Soc'y REV. 11, 40-42 (1984) (delimiting the vast domain of
private lawmaking).
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to prevent the wrongdoer from causing further harm." 169 Moreover,
given the powerful psychological sanctions available to the tribal com-
munity in the form of ridicule, ostracism, and banishment, it is not
difficult to manipulate the need of a wrongdoer to remain in good stead
within the community. 170 Finally, in TPM juvenile wrongdoers are
commonly assigned to perform community service for elder members of
the tribe, and often these elders transform into role models who help to
guide the youths under their stewardship to success while preserving the
tribe from fragmentation as would otherwise occur were such youths sent
to prison.17 1
5. Response from Outside Indian Country
a. The Indian Tribal Justice Act
The development and introduction of TPM in the United States and
Canada 172 did not escape the notice of state and federal justice officials.
169. Costello, supra note 5, at 899-900.
170. Research in the nexus between political economics and anthropology suggests that the insti-
tution of the tribe performs an essential insurance function by facilitating fundamental survival tasks
that can only be performed in teams and that tribal members, in exchange for this insurance, grant
their loyalty unreservedly to the tribe. As a product of these mutually advantageous, continuous, and
critical intratribal interactions and the ease of observing and transmitting information and norms within
the small community, the problem of monitoring to prevent free-riding inherent in team production
disappears. In other words, not only does the tribe reduce or eliminate bad-faith incentives to
opportunism or cheating, but expulsion, ostracism, and other forms of collective refusal to deal, highly
effective sanctions given the importance of individual reputation and face-saving in a small interdepen-
dent circle, are far more cost-effective and efficient than formal legal enforcement mechanisms.
See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
235, 245-47 (1979); see also Roback, supra note 54, at 11; Posner, supra note 32, at 143-44.
Research into the legal system of other tribal communities supports the finding that the psycho-
logical pressure is at least as effective in securing compliance with tribal remedies as the formal
institutions of state coercion are in enforcing official justice. See Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 4, at
358-59 (noting that among the Roma, the permanent sentence of marime ("impurity" requiring ostra-
cism and even banishment) is considered the equivalent of a death penalty since the permanent out-
cast, subjected to enforcement of the sentence by the gossip and shunning of the entire Roma
community, is frequently driven to suicide); see also Posner, supra note 32, at 182 n.144 (describing
how Amish wrongdoers are required to make public confessions lest they be shunned, a fate which
results in the deviant member becoming a complete social pariah with whom no one will eat, speak, or
do business).
171. See Costello, supra note 5, at 893.
172. By 1988, the Canadian government was implementing TPM on a number of reserves (the
Canadian term for a reservation) as a parallel aboriginal justice system formally exempt, as culturally
appropriate, from the individual rights restrictions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
(the analog of the U.S. Constitution), including inter alia the right to remain silent and the freedom
from unreasonable search and seizure. See Putting an End to Native Injustice, ToRONTO STAR, Sept. 5,
1991, at A 18. Concerned that a disproportional number of indigenous people were being sent to prison
environments that discouraged "disclosure, openness, [and] healing" of indigenous offenders, the
Canadian judiciary permitted a number of tribes to operate "community sentencing circles" and other
methods of TPM and community mediation wherein the interests of tribal communities, victims, offend-
ers, and the Crown are heard and balanced and the concept of justice is understood to require the full
participation and healing of victims, offenders, and members of Indian and non-Indian communities
alike. See Ross G. Green, Aboriginal Community Sentencing and Mediating: Within and Without the
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With the change in 'the political winds ushered in by the 1992 elections,
the U.S. moved to make self-determination more meaningful in terms of
the legal autonomy of the Indian tribes. In 1993, the U.S. Congress,
explicitly anticipating that Indian nations would adopt and utilize their
own culturally appropriate forms of dispute resolution, enacted the
Indian Tribal Justice Act (ITJA)173 to fund174 and strengthen traditional
tribal legal systems. 175 Moreover, relevant provisions of ITJA explicitly
renounced any congressional intention to interfere with the methods in
which Indian nations dispense justice.176 In response, U.S. Attorney
General Janet Reno, already a proponent of cross-cultural borrowing
generally and TPM specifically,177 established the Office of Tribal
Justice and Tribal Courts Project to support the purposes of ITJA.178
b. But Indians Have No Law!
Although the passage of ITJA and the creation of the Office of
Tribal Justice and Tribal Courts Project encouraged both Indian and
non-Indian advocates of TPM,179 by the mid-1990s TPM, after nearly a
decade in existence, was not bereft of critics. Many neutral observers
have offered general criticisms of alternative dispute resolution as a
corrupt, commercialized gimmick threatening the integrity of the jury
system.180 While many non-Indians, still laboring under the "Indians
Circle, 25 MAN. L.J. 77, 77-81 (1997). Although community sentencing circles proved successful in
reducing recidivism, reintegrating offenders into their communities, and strengthening tribal com-
munities, critics contended that Canada was establishing a divisive double judicial standard with one
set of rules for Indians and one for everyone else that was subject to political influence and violative
of individual rights. See Craig Turner, "Native Justice" in Canada; For Many Indians, Experts Say,
Prison is No Deterrent to Crime, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 1996, at Al; see also Ruth Walker, In Canada,
Solving Youth Crime the Tribal Way, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Nov. 12, 1998, at B3 (detailing the
Canadian experience with juvenile Indian offenders diverted to TPM).
173. Indian Tribal Justice Act (ITJA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994).
174. See 25 U.S.C. § 3611(c)(6).
175. See 25 U.S.C. § 3602(8).
176. See 25 U.S.C. § 361 1(d) (requiring that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be deemed or con-
strued to authorize the Office [of Tribal Justice Support] to impose justice standards on Indian tribes");
see also 25 U.S.C. § 3631(4) (requiring that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to alter in any
way ANY tribal traditional dispute resolution forum").
177. See Goldberg, supra note 149, at 1006. According to Attorney General Reno,
crime victims would be better served if state and federal justice systems emulated
[TPM]. [The crime] ... victim does not feel whole until there is some resolution to the
bitterness ... inflicted by the crime. [TPM] heals rather than determining guilt... [and]
resolve[s] problems instead of processing cases in lengthy adversarial proceedings.
Goldberg, supra note 149, at 1006.
178. See Costello, supra note 5, at 877.
179. See Goldberg, supra note 149, at 1006. Among others, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, frustrated at the inefficiencies inherent in litigation, expressed her expectation that
[TPM] "will provide a model from which the Federal and State courts can benefit as they seek to
encompass alternatives to the Anglo-American adversarial model." Goldberg, supra note 149, at 1006
n.15.
180. See James Reuben, The Lawyer Turns Peacemaker, in JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., PROCESSES OF
DispurE RESOLtIrON: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 320 (1996) (noting that the most hostile critics of ADR
condemned what they envisioned as "kangaroo courts [that] deliver a skewed brand of justice that
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have no law" myth and still determined to control tribal life through
imposed neocolonial legal systems, expressed specific distrust of TPM, a
non-punitive method of dispute resolution inaccessible to their
Western-encultured psyches.181
For this "ADR-as-gimmick" school of naysayers, the traditional
Indian cultural context was so eroded through colonization182 that the
tribal values and teachings in traditional languages and religions at the
core of TPM "do not carry . . . the cultural resonance that peacemakers
presume ... [, and] clan relationships that would ensure compliance with
[TPM] agreements are seriously compromised." 183 The most serious
condemnations were issued from Congress, through repeated attempts to
further impose the formality and adjudicative cultural bias of the
American legal system upon tribal societies by waiving tribal sovereign
immunity and permitting federal judicial review of tribal justice "when
they act in a totally lawless fashion."18 4 U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch
excoriated TPM for its "[n]on-public proceedings, [lack of] represen-
tation by counsel, [lack of] notification of procedural rights," and em-
ployment of remedies incomprehensible to the dominant society, such as
banishment, restitution, and flogging. 185 Despite the failure of such
fails to provide adequate remedies for women and minorities" and "give the powerful a way around
the law").
181. See Zion & Yazzie, supra note 43, at 83-84; see also McCarthy; supra note 112, at 466-67
(suggesting that mainstream criminal justice is "rough and wild" in the sense that revenge, punishment,
and control drives the process, whereas in contrast TPM, even as applied to what would be deemed
criminal in mainstream society, is sacred justice designed to heal).
182. Federal assimilative programs which included removal of children from Indian families and
forced fragmentation of tribal lands, have impoverished collective tribal knowledge of languages,
cultures, religions, and above all traditional patterns of egalitarianism and mutual respect in relational
behaviors, including honoring elders and women. As a consequence, in certain tribal communities
ravaged by colonialism and paternalism, cultural identification, with the traditional peacemakers who
have the responsibility to teach and uphold, may be extremely tenuous, particularly on the part of those
most likely to become miscreants--troubled youth who have not had the benefit of proper parental
modeling. See, e.g., Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons from Navajo
Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1, 100 (1999) (demonstrating that although the onus for cultural
annihilation lies upon the colonizers, when tribal communities are not as responsible or affirmative in
instilling and upholding traditional cultural as they must be if TPM, which depends upon public
acceptance and commitment to traditional tribal values, is to effectively displace imposed justice
systems, the door is open to external, i.e. non-Indian, criticism).
183. Id. at 99. This is a critical point: as a matter of democratic political theory, the legitimacy of
TPM, as with any other justice system, depends upon whether participants voluntarily acknowledge,
accept, and conform their conduct to its prescriptions and proscriptions. This is particularly so for
Indian people given their tradition of rather loosely organized governmental structures the continuity
of which required constant popular affirmation. See Valencia-Weber, supra note 50, at 250.
184. McCarthy, supra note 112, at 466.
185. McCarthy, supra note 112, at 466. White legislators eager to undercut popular and federal
legislative support for TPM referenced the case of a 17-year-old female member of the Warm
Springs Indians in Oregon whose involvement in drugs, gang activity, and other antisocial behavior led
her distraught mother to appeal to tribal justice authorities for help. See Tribal Officials Whip Girl, 17,
Despite Her Mother's Protests, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1994, at A38. After a TPM ceremony the peace-
maker, with the agreement of the girl and her family, elected to employ the well-established traditional
whipping ceremony used continuously for centuries by several Northwestern tribes, and the girl was
ceremonially whipped while kneeling on a buckskin and surrounded by her extended family and tribal
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legislation, the argument that tribal jurisprudence is incapable of pro-
ducing cognizable fairness and justice was reinforced and accorded the
official imprimatur of a significant plurality of the legislative branch.I86
c. Feminist Criticism
Although its motivations were in all likelihood less the product of
opposition to Indian tribal sovereignty and more the inspiration of a
pan-feminist agenda, another body of anti-TPM analysis issued forth
from non-Indian feminist scholars. While conceding certain benefits of
TPM as applied to the resolution of domestic violence cases in Indian
communities, 187 these scholars contended that TPM, often implemented
without the informed consent, depreciates the focus on the interests of
battered Indian women.18 8 Remedies obtainable only in formal adjudi-
cation1 89 are abandoned in favor of a fixation on the restoration of the
batterer to the community. The "harmony" of tribes fails to acknowl-
edge their internal sexist practices' 90 and treat women's stories of abuse,
as anecdotal or even the natural male response to female provocation
and further erodes the situation faced by a battered Indian woman. 191
However, despite genuine attempts at evenhandedness and the pro-Indian
credentials of many of their authors, as a number of Indian feminist
scholars were quick to indicate,192 the criticisms leveled by non-Indian
feminists at TPM struck many of the same chords as did those offered
elders. See id. Not only did the whipping inflict no physical injury, but the incorrigible girl remained
abusive and required dispatch to a tribal boarding school for girls in Oklahoma; nevertheless, many
non-Indian observers registered their "shock" at the "barbarity" of TPM-authorized ceremonial
whipping. See id.
186. See Valencia-Weber, supra note 50, at 239, 247, 254 (contending that issue is reducible to
an ideological conflict dominated by the fact that "tribal courts ... don't have systems the dominate
society thinks they ought to have").
187. See Coker, supra note 182, at 38, 42 (conceding, along with other non-Indian feminists, that
TPM can overcome typical obstacles such as denial and silence to restructure tribal power relations,
"address both systemic and personal aspects of battering and thus disrupt the familial and social sup-
ports for battering," "foster social and personal change through narratives based on gender-egali-
tarian understandings of male-female relations," and "foster a 'safe connection' that does not treat as
pathology women's multiple loyalties, including their commitment to relationships with men who have
been abusive"). Coker, among other non-Indian feminists, also hales TPM for providing material and
legal services to make Indian woman less dependent on their abusers; providing referrals to social
service agencies and to traditional healing ceremonies to increase support networks for battered
women; requiring batterers to assume personal responsibility for their conduct, seek drug and alcohol
treatment, and disassociate from destructive social circles; and incorporating mandatory arrest and
reporting provisions, which extend to the workplace and educational environments and promote safety
and well-being of all tribal members. See Coker, supra note 182, at 50, 105, 124-26, 134-35.
188. See Coker, supra note 182, at 84 (suggesting that TPM can focus inordinately on the offend-
er and his "healing" in the interests of reciprocity to the point of demanding that the battered give him
an apology, which she may not mean).
189. See Coker, supra note 182, at 103 (contrasting a "separation focus" in formal adjudication
with a "stay-married" focus in TPM).
190. See Coker, supra note 182, at 71.
191. See Coker, supra note 182, at 93-94.
192. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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by the architects and custodians of the imposed legal system still
smothering Indian culture and sovereignty.
d. The Balkanization Argument
A final criticism centered upon the notion that following the
example of TPM any group, no matter how dubiously constituted,1
93
could now claim the rights to be governed by its own customs "dressed
up as law" and to demand recognition and enforcement of that "law"
in state and federal courts to the detriment of the union. 194 However,
proponents of TPM noted the special political status of Indian tribes and
drew attention to the fact that by the mid-1990s the destructive results of
two centuries of colonialist politico-economic subordination, 195 coupled
193. Indian tribes are not merely ethnic or religious communities but are also unique and distinct
in their political and legal relationship to the state and federal governments. "The condition of the
Indians in relation to the United States is, perhaps, unlike that of any other two people in existence
[and is] marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist no where else." Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 16 (1831).
The federal-tribal relationship is premised upon broad but not unlimited federal
constitutional power over Indian affairs, often described as "plenary." The relationship
is also distinguished by special trust obligations requiring the United States to adhere
strictly to fiduciary standards in its dealings with Indians. The inherent tension between
broad federal authority and special federal trust obligations has produced a unique body
of law.
CottN, supra note 82, at 207. Thus, although Indian tribes can legitimately claim both a natural law
and Constitutional basis for distinct treatment as (quasi) sovereigns and an entitlement under inter-
national and domestic law to make and enforce their own law at least over tribal members on reserva-
tion lands and to argue for the recognition and enforcement of such judgments in U.S. and state courts
provided such judgments do not offend public policy, the same political status and legal entitlement
cannot be claimed for example, members of other minority racial or ethnic groups, religious groups,
civil associations, etc. See infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text. This, however, does not mean
to suggest that there cannot be other bases for the public recognition and enforcement of the private
laws of other entities (e.g., the Roma, Orthodox Jewish, universities, etc.).
194. See Reisman, supra note 10, at 412. Positivists, with Reisman foremost among them, are
disturbed by the potentiality of the balkanization of American public law and its displacement by an
ethnic legal checkerboard less capable of protecting individual rights and more prone to political
contestation. In his words:
Where there are many groups coexisting in a territory, each may have its own unique
vision of past and future, its own language or dialect, its own values, and its own
mysterious law, emerging, as group members are encouraged to believe, as a sort of ex-
crescence of the group experience. Superordinating the law of any one group over the
others is a prescription for endless conflict. Redefining law in secular and entirely
ahistorical terms, as authoritative policy clarification and implementation by the state
apparatus, certainly has intellectual limits. Nevertheless, it permits the law to take on a
constructive mediating role between the different groups that constitute the community.
... [This] [P]ositivis[t] . . . ideology [of] contemporary America . . . promises some
protection for all groups ....
Reisman, supra note 10, at 412-13.
195. Thirty-five years after the Civil Rights Movement, Indian reservations remain an internal
exile system of concentrated, tenacious poverty and restricted access to education, health care, and
markets. The Indian unemployment rate is 45%, now 37% times the national average, and 31% of
Indians live below the poverty line. See Robert J. Miller & Maril Hazlett, The "Drunken Indian":
Myth Distilled into Reality Through Federal Indian Alcohol Policy, 28 Aiuz. ST. L.J. 223, 230 (1996).
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with the cultural assault upon traditional legal systems, were manifesting
themselves in a violent crime wave sweeping out of the inner cities and
devastating Indian Country. Relying on patterns of increased gang-
related activities,196 along with statistics that Indians were more than twice
as likely as other Americans to become murder victims and thirty-eight
percent more likely to be incarcerated, 197 TPM advocates insisted that
restoring the fabric of traditional tribal culture was the only effective
solution to the problems of reservation crime and the destruction of their
youth.198 Thus, many Indian tribes are bent to refining and developing
TPM as the appropriate method for resolving disputes between tribal
members on tribal lands in an increasingly desperate effort to reclaim
their cultural autonomy and salvage a better future for their wayward
youth. Cross-boundary enforcement of TPM outcomes, whether on the
basis of full-faith-and-credit 9 9 or comity
20 0 were simply not at issue. 20 1
These statistics and negative social indicators derivative from the material process of forced
dependency and underdevelopment, such as life expectancy, infant mortality, generational poverty,
substance abuse, and suicide rates, are markedly worse for Indians than for every other American sub-
population. See generally id. Even now, most Indian reservations remain vast expanses of joblessness
and hopelessness, with Indians the most disadvantaged minority group in the U.S. For a thorough
account of the statistical indicators of Indian politico-economc dependency and their contributions to
Indian social pathology, see Steven J. Prince, The Political Economy of Articulation: Federal Policy
and the Native American/Euroamerican Modes of Production (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Utah) (on file with the University of Utah Library). Also see ROBERT N. WELLS, JR.,
NATIVE AMERCAN RESURGENCE AND RENEWAL (1994).
196. A U.S. Department of Justice study found that in 70% of violent episodes against Indians the
offender was a non-Indian. See Philip Brasher, Indians Victimized by Violence, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb.
15, 1999, at 53.
197. See id.
198. Tribal elders, speaking amongst themselves of a "lost generation," warned that the prolifera-
tion of drugs, gangs, homicides, and sex abuse was the direct result of the erosion of traditional
languages, religions, and cultures, and in particular of a loss of respect for elders. As the mother of
the first Navajo juvenile sentenced as an adult in gang-related homicide lamented:
Navajos are supposed to be real close, but that way of life is dying away. I was raised to
get up at 4 a.m., greet the sun and then toss com pollen in the four directions for wisdom
and strength. I tried to get my son to do that and it was chaos, He'd yell, "Leave me
alone!" We parents failed these kids because we all came from dysfunctional families.
Louis Sahagun, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1997, at A18.
199. The Full Faith and Credit Clause in Article IV, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution is imple-
mented by 28 U.S.C. § 1738 which requires that judgments "of any court of [a] State, Territory or
Possession" be enforced by the receiving jurisdiction as res judicata, thereby solidifying the political
unity of the states through reciprocal legal obligations. However, Indian tribal courts are not men-
tioned in 28 U.S.C. § 1738, and with few exceptions federal courts have held that an Indian tribe
cannot be defined as a "State, Territory or Possession." See Desjarlait v. Desjarlait, 379 N.W.2d 139,
144 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that full faith and credit do not require recognition of tribal custom
as the foundation for the decision of a tribal court). Although in specific subject areas, such as the
Indian Child Welfare Act, Congress has required that state courts recognize and enforce tribal court
judgments, and although tribal court money judgments can be recognized and enforced in state courts
after transformation into state judgments under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act,
§ 2, 13 U.L.A. 152 (1986), barring Congressional or state legislative intent to extend full faith and
credit to particular classes of disputes the judgments emanating from tribal legal proceedings are not
entitled to enforcement in any other jurisdictions. For a general discussion of full faith and credit as
applied to the Indian context, see Valencia-Weber, supra note 50, at 243.
200. See Laurence, supra note 113, at 130 (noting that the majority pattern is nonrecognition and
nonenforcement of tribal court decisions in state courts even where the tribal court had subject matter
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However, despite the clear substantive boundaries circumscribing its
applications and thereby enhancing its potential to develop traditional
Indian legal systems and aid in the reclamation of Indian culture and
sovereignty, TPM, already caught in the teeth of criticism emanating
from disparate quarters, was drawn into the worst possible scenario: a
controversial criminal case 202 in which two Indian youths were charged
in the court of a state politically hostile to Indian rights with a serious
off-reservation physical attack upon a non-Indian.
IV. THE GREAT EXPERIMENT: THE CASE OF THE TLINGIT
PIZZA BANDITS
A. THE BRUTAL CRIME: SORRY WASN'T ENOUGH
Like so many other tribes in the late 1980s, the Tlingit 203 Indians of
the Yukon region of southeastern Alaska204 began employing TPM as
part of a larger tribal effort to reestablish traditional tribal values among
their youth. In one of its earliest applications, Tlingit TPM205 was used
in the case of an adult Tlingit, an admitted pedophile who, while very
intoxicated, molested a Tlingit girl on the reservation. 206 A Tlingit
and personal jurisdiction over the defendant and comity would suggest enforcement). The broad
consistency between the foreign judgment and local public policy which is generally presumed in the
case of sister states or nations is not presumed in the case of Indian tribes on the specious theory that,
despite the restructuring of Indian tribal courts to resemble American courts under the IRA and ICRA,
Indian cultural differences manifest themselves in tribal court customs, procedures, and decisions the
enforcement of which in state courts would "shock the conscience." See Laurence, supra note 113, at
126-27. In all likelihood, TPM, a form of dispute resolution even less homologous to Western-style
adjudication, is even less likely to inspire judicial comity.
201. See Laurence, supra note 113, at 147 (explaining that as coercion is explicitly prohibited in
TPM, the purpose of which is to reach a consensus which restores the tribe to harmony, resolutions of
TPM "courts" are never entitled to coercive enforcement, whether on or off the reservation). But see
Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 4, at 357 (noting that in California the Roma, an insular community
whose legal system is analogous in many respects to TPM, have referred nonbinding recommendations
to California courts, principally to remove the "forum shopping" incentive whereby Roma dissenters
had been appealing to the American legal system for results different from what they expected in the
Roma courts). It is not inconceivable that Indian tribes might pursue a strategy similar to the Roma
should TPM prove less able to restore tribal harmony than its advocates expect.
202. See Rosenn, supra note 22, at 248 (stressing that in any discussion of traditional Indian legal
systems by non-Indians, complex subissues such as religion, politics, and community rights surge to the
fore, and that different cultural approaches to criminal punishment will tend to draw fundamental
values into irreconcilable conflict more frequently than any other legal subject matter).
203. The English-language approximation of the pronunciation of Tlingit is "CLINK-ut." See
Experiment in Tribal Justice: 2 Youth Are Banished, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1994, § 1, at 6.
204. Most of the 2,000 member Tlingit Nation, an indigenous community formally associated with
the Haida Indians and governed by the federally-recognized Tlingit-Haida Central Council, most live
on coastal reservation islands in the Alexander Archipelago in the Gulf of Alaska in the southeastern
corner of that state; nearly 1,000 Tlingit of the dominant clan live in Klawock, headquarters of the
Central Council, on Prince of Wales Island. See Timothy Egan, Indian Boys' Exile Turns Out to be a
Hoax, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 31, 1994, at A12.
205. This system of dispute resolution closely mirrored the standard model described in supra
Part II.
206. See Sherryl Yeager, Yukon Clan Use Tribal Justice to Fight Crime, TbRONrO STAR, Apr. 19,
1992, at B4.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
peacemaker restored tribal members to harmony by inducing the
wrongdoer to make a public ceremonial apology, solemnly promise
never to repeat the offense, receive alcohol treatment, cease drinking
permanently, and accept a month of house arrest followed by three
years' probation, the violation of which would result in his imprison-
ment. 207 By 1992, after a half-decade of employing TPM as a substitute
for tribal court adjudication, the Tlingit were enjoying a thirty-five per-
cent decrease in crime, 208 and other tribal, state, and federal governments
were looking to Tlingit TPM as a model worthy of emulation. 209 How-
ever, in August 1993, while visiting family near Seattle, Washington,
seventeen year-olds Adrian J. Guthrie and Simon P. Roberts, 2 10 Tlingits
and cousins, initiated a series of events which damaged the non-Indian
perception of TPM and complicated the task of reclaiming tribal sover-
eignty through law.
On the fateful afternoon, Guthrie and Roberts, after telephoning for
a pizza delivery and requesting that the driver bring change for a $50
bill, laid in wait for the driver, Tim Whittlesey. 211 Upon Whittlesey's
arrival Guthrie and Roberts attacked him from behind with a baseball
bat, fracturing his skull in multiple places and leaving him deaf and
partially blind.212 District Attorneys Michael Magee and Seth Fine
promptly charged Guthrie and Roberts as adults with first-degree armed
robbery and assault with a deadly weapon. Under Washington law, these
charges carried sentences of three to five and one-half years in prison
upon conviction. 213
B. HERE'S YOUR BIG CHANCE: GIVING TPM AN AUDITION
In May 1994, however, after nearly ten months in Snohomish
County Jail awaiting trial, Tlingit tribal officials, and in particular Tlingit
elder Rudy James, secured a form of plea bargain unique in American
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. The ITJA was enacted in retrospect as an acknowledgment not only of the success of TPM
within the Indian communities it had been serving but also of the potential contributions TPM might
make as a "donor" for legal transplantation to the state and federal criminal justice systems. See supra
note 176.
210. Guthrie and Roberts, recipients of a mixed traditional-modern upbringing, had not had exten-
sive prior contact with law enforcement authorities. See Thomas W. Haines, "Sorry Isn't Enough"-
Contrite Kids Welcome Tribal Judgment, SEATrLE Tnms, July 16, 1994, at Al.
211. See John Balzar, Two Alaskan Indian Youth Banished to Island for Robbery, L.A. TIMES, July
15, 1994, at A3.
212. See id. Whittlesey, a young married man, was so seriously injured his life was initially in
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history.2 14 In exchange for a guilty plea in Snohomish Superior Court,
Judge James Allendoerfer, though unfamiliar with any precedent,2 15
agreed to accept a $25,000 bond and release Guthrie and Roberts to the
custody of James and the Kuye'di Kuiu Kwaan Tribal Court (Tlingit
TPM court). The release was conditioned on the requirements that the
Tlingit TPM Court would impose their suggested sentence of a year-long
banishment to make Guthrie and Roberts ruminate on their crime, purify
their spirits,216 and make restitution to Whittlesey. 217 All parties agreed
that Judge Allendoerfer would retain jurisdiction and that Guthrie and
Roberts would be haled before him after eighteen months to determine
whether the case should be closed or additional punishment should be
imposed. 218
District Attorneys Magee and Fine opposed the precedent this deci-
sion219 would purportedly establish on the grounds that allowing TPM to
displace adjudication in Snohomish Superior Court would open the
floodgates to "all sorts of cultural exceptions and challenges to state law
. . . based on someone's cultural background." 220  Other critics con-
demned banishment as a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
214. See Experiment in Tribal Justice; 2 Youths Are Banished, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1994, § 1, at
6.
215. See id. In fact, in the post-Crow Dog era no state court had ever previously referred a
criminal case over which it had original jurisdiction and which arose off-reservation to an Indian tribal
court. See id
216. See Haines, supra note 210. As James explained the Tlingit concept of banishment, "We
put them in nature that's absolutely pure so their thoughts and attitudes can be affected by nature and
nature's god. By beholding (nature) you become changed." Haines, supra note 210.
217. The banishment proposed by the James-constituted Tlingit TPM Court in order to secure the
plea bargain included the provisions that Guthrie and Roberts would be confined to separate tribal
islands, provided with only two weeks' food supply, and supplied with only those hand tools necessary
to procure fish and game and survive in harsh and unremitting conditions. See Balzar, supra note 211.
Tlingit elders promised that Guthrie and Roberts, while banished, would cut enough pine logs so that
upon their restoration to the tribe they would be able to build Whittlesey a new duplex and sell enough
lumber to pay for the $3,000 worth of uncovered medical bills. See Haines, supra note 210.
218. See Haines, supra note 210. As Washington law makes no provision for relinquishing juris-
diction in criminal cases to other tribunals, Judge Allendoerfer was restrained from actually transfer-
ring the case to the Tinglit TPM Court and technically only postponed sentencing while reserving the
right to sentence Guthrie and Roberts in the event banishment failed. See Haines, supra note 210.
219. See generally State v. Guthrie, 894 P.2d 1340 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
220. Balzar, supra note 211. In short order Snohomish county prosecutor, William Jaquette,
clearly interested in the imposition of prison sentences and frustrated that even were it so inclined the
Tlingit TPM Court could not impose any sentence greater than one year (the ICRA limits the capacity
of tribal courts, see 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1994)), made even more critical ex parte comments on
the applicability of TPM to cases before state courts:
It's racist to treat people differently based on their ethnic background. It should not
matter who a person is but the crime that was committed. What happens when another
person, say a Tahitian wants to serve his sentence in Tahiti? What will we say to him?
We have sentencing guidelines for judges to follow to avoid things like this.
Michael Sangiacomo, 2 Youths Face Tribal Justice; May be Sentenced to Remote Islands, PLAIN
DEALER, Sept. 1, 1994, at Al. Others soon joined Magee in branding TPM a "bizarre experiment in
criminal justice" that accords "special treatment" to Indians. Id.
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the constitutional rights of the defendants 221 or as a violation of Alaskan
child welfare laws. Nevertheless, in late August 1994, Judge Allen-
doerfer, with the eyes of the Indian and legal communities upon him,
denied a number of prosecution motions and ordered the release of the
convicted Tlingit duo to Tlingit representatives based on (1) the strength
of the promises of several Tlingit elders to monitor, but not assist Guthrie
and Roberts, (2) the desire to rehabilitate the offenders, (3) the utility of
the sentence of banishment in terms of the conservation of state
resources, 222 and (4) the apparent contrition of the wrongdoers.2 23
C. TLINGIT TPM A HOAX? RAISING THE QUESTION OF TRIBAL
COMMITMENT
However, before Guthrie and Roberts even reached the Tlingit
reservation, a firestorm of rumor, innuendo, and [dis]information erupt-
ed, revealing rifts both within the Tlingit tribe and between the Tlingits
and mainstream society that threatened the success of the experiment
before it had even begun. When Guthrie and Roberts were a week late in
reporting to the Tlingit TPM Court, Magee, publicly suspecting they had
fled to Canada, 224 filed a motion in the Washington Court of Appeals to
221. Banishment as a punishment was used by the ancient Greeks as well as the English, who
referred to their dispatch of convicts to Australia and the New World as "transportation"; many
indigenous groups continue to use banishment and other centuries-old pre-Columbian forms of social
ostracism as inducements to conform with group expectations. Opinion was divided as to the sentence
of banishment offered as a plea bargain for Guthrie and Roberts, with some maintaining that
banishment was less cruel than imprisonment, particularly for the young (some derisively referred to it
as an "extended vacation"), and others certain that banishment was a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."); see also
Sangiacomo, supra note 220. By branding banishment "cruel and unusual" simply because federal
and state courts had previously deemed it so and because Guthrie and Roberts were obligated to
procure their own sustenance in wilderness conditions and to provide for their own medical care,
several commentators betrayed a lack of understanding of and appreciation for the Tlingit relationship
to their natural environment as well as an utter incapacity to appreciate the purposive dissociation of
Tlingit TPM from much of U.S. and state constitutional jurisprudence-a dissociation sanctioned to
significant extent by the Constitution and federal laws such as the ITJA. See, e.g., Stephanie J. Kim,
29 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 239,258-60 (1995).
222. Banishment would allow the State of Washington to save the costs that otherwise would be
incurred in incarcerating Guthrie and Roberts.
223. See Haines, supra note 210 (reporting that both Guthrie and Roberts appeared initially to be
genuinely remorseful and desirous of rehabilitation and restitution). While interviewed in prison await-
ing release to tribal officials, Guthrie made the following statement about his hopes for his banishment:
I don't want to say it's better. But here, I sit and watch TV, order food from the commis-
sary, have friends and play cards. There's nothing punishing and rehabilitating about it.
Most of my time [during banishment] will be spent thinking about what's transpired...
That's why I'm going out there. [The robbery] was never meant to be like it was. And
sorry isn't a big enough word.
Haines, supra note 210.
224. See Egan, supra note 204. In fact, Guthrie and Roberts were en route, having taken a ferry
to Alaska and then driven to Ketchican before completing the journey by ground transportation. At all
times tribal officials were in custody of the two. See Sangiacomo, supra note 220.
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overturn Judge Allendoerfer's order delaying sentencing. 2 2 5 Legal-
historical research, aided by Tlingit opponents of the proposed banish-
ment, revealed that in traditional Tlingit culture punishments for serious
physical attacks upon others included slavery, dismemberment of digits
or hands, or execution, but not banishment. 2 26 Suspicion then turned
upon James: newspapers-of-record reported that of the eight people
James had listed as tribal elders in his request for alternative sentencing
all were members of his own nuclear family and six had criminal rec-
ords.2 27 Moreover, James was not technically a Tlingit judicial official
and had not lived on Tlingit land for over thirty years. 2 2 8 Edward
Thomas, one of three official Tlingit tribal court judges, was not alone in
expressing his fear that James' machinations would bring ridicule upon
the Tlingit and "could lead to us all being branded as makeshift,
conniving and dishonorable."
22 9
D. TPM TAKES THE STAGE
Nevertheless, in early September, twelve Tlingit elders served as
peacemakers in a two-day TPM ceremony in which Whittlesey and his
wife, Guthrie and Roberts and their extended families, and other Tlingits
gathered to hear and restore all parties. After Guthrie and Roberts
indicated they had been drunk when they committed the crime and
expressed their great remorse and shame at length, tribal elders
225. The Washington Court of Appeals subsequently granted a prosecution motion and over-
turned Judge Allendoerfer on the issue of whether banishment might result in reduced sentences for
Guthrie and Roberts, holding that banishment might be a supplemental, but not a substitute, form of
punishment. See Louis Sahagun, Banishment Tests Not Only Criminals but Their Tribe as Well, L.A.
TIMAEs, June 21, 1995, at 5.
226. See Sangiacomo, supra note 220; Egan, supra note 204.
227. See Egan, supra note 204. Further investigative journalism conducted after the banishment
began revealed that James' brother Daryle had been convicted of sexual assaults of non-Indian
juveniles in Washington State in 1975 and Ketchikan, Alaska in the early 1990s, and that in the latter
case James had filed an unsuccessful motion with the state court asking for sentencing by the Tlingit
TPM Court. See No To Tribal Justice, SEATrLE TIMEs, May 2, 1995, at B4.
228. See Egan, supra note 204. The revelations about James, who was suspected within the tribe
of seeking to profit from tabloid money and movie rights, were particularly disturbing to the Tlingit
Tribal Vice President, Aaron laacs, who had the following to say about the developing fiasco: "Rudy
James was just making this up as he went along. The biggest problem the native people have with this
now is we are going to be held responsible for the promises of Rudy James . . . We are going to be
stuck with the $25,000 in restitution." Egan, supra note 204.
229. Egan, supra note 204. For most members of the federally-recognized Tlingit-Haida Central
Council in Klawock, a modernist/assimilationist approach to crime generally and the case of Guthrie
and Roberts dictated a solution in the courts of Washington State, and James, a traditionalist outsider of
an inferior clan, had no authority, customary or otherwise, to interject himself into the administration
of tribal legal affairs. Thus, the official position of the Tlingit-Haida Central Council was and has
remained that the "banishment" of Guthrie and Roberts was without the official sanction of the Tlingit
tribe, and the weight of any resultant failures or embarrassments ought to be borne exclusively by
James. Telephone Interviews with Michelle Matt, Representative of Tlingit-Haida Central Council,
and Roseanne Demmert, former President of Tlingit-Haida Central Council (July 7, 2000).
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"suggested" banishment and restitution as James had promised Judge
Allendoerfer they would. Whittlesey then gave his unreserved blessing
to the proposal 230 as a means better suited even than American-style
adjudication to provide atonement and rehabilitation.2 31 Tribal elders,
buoyed by a result which underscored their cultural distinctiveness and
sovereignty, 232 passed sentences of banishment upon Guthrie and
Roberts and urged that all Tlingits, including a newly forgiven James,233
"move together forward as brothers and sisters" to make the first banish-
ment in modem history a landmark in cooperation between a state and
tribal court. 234
However, despite the approval of the settlement by all those im-
mediately concerned with the dispute, non-Indian critics lambasted the
outcome on procedural and substantive grounds. One commentator
referred to the process as "anything but organized or ordinary ....
[Jiudges sometimes seemed to make up the rules as they went along ....
They made strange demands, such as telling spectators not to turn their
heads to watch the judges enter."2 35 Others recapitulated the notion that
encouraging TPM would goad foreign nationals to demand the applica-
tion of their own national legal systems or allow wealthy defendants to
purchase justice by paying off restitution to avoid jail. Still others
claimed that smirks on the faces of Guthrie and Roberts as tribal elders
handed down the sentence presaged a lack of commitment to their own
rehabilitation that would lead to the failure of banishment as a substitute
for incarceration. 236
230. See Phil Reeves, Tribal "Court" Banishes Alaskan Pizza Bandits, INDEPENDENT (London),
Sept. 4, 1994, at 10. Tlingit tribal justice officials insisted that the approval of Whittlesey, as well as
any other future victim who was not a member of the Tlingit, was sine qua non for a case to be heard
in Tlingit TPM Court; similarly, Tlingit officials indicated that the consent of Whittlesey was required
for any resolution of the dispute. See id.
231. See id. Most Alaskans were far more skeptical that banishment would prove of sufficient
punitive value: as an elderly white fisherman put it, "Anyone can get to these places [where Guthrie
and Roberts would be banished] by boat. Their pals will be out there every night, drinking beer and
smoking dope." Id. at 11.
232. See Sangiacomo, supra note 220. Several tribal elders expressed the hope that their conduct
of the Guthrie and Roberts banishment would encourage "State and federal authorities [to] recognize
the historical rights of Native Americans-already recognized by the United Nations and other
bodies--to conduct their own affairs, which includes government and judicial systems." Michael
Sangiacomo, A Different Kind of Justice; Alaskan Indian Court May Open the Door to Alternatives,
PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 11, 1994 at Al.
233. See Michael Sangiacomo, Life in Exile; As Judges Visit Their Remote Island, Banished Boys
Aren't in Total Isolation, PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 25, 1994, at Al. Seizing upon the spirit of reconciliation,
James commented that "We want them to come out of this whole, clean Tlingit gentlemen, get married
and raise a family," but "[n]othing is over until the victim feels like he is fully compensated for his loss
and says so.... Then Judge Allendoerfer and the tribal court must be satisfied." Id.
234. See Experiment in Tribal Justice; 2 Youths are Banished, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3., 1994, at A6.
235. See Sangiacomo, supra note 232.
236. See Suzanne Fields, No Midnight Basketballfor Tlingits, ATLANTA CoNsT., Sept. 12, 1994, at
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E. TPM UNDER THE SPOTLIGHT: BANISHMENT, A COMPROMISE
COMPROMISED
On September 6, Tlingit elders, including family members, deliv-
ered Guthrie and Roberts by boat to their exile on two separate remote
islands the locations, which were kept secret to prevent interference by
press or other parties. After assisting them in constructing one-room
shelters, the elders left them to the certainty of a brutal winter with
fishing poles, a wood stove, sleeping bags, religious books, a two-week
supply of food and little more than dogs to protect against wolves and
bears.237 Guthrie and Roberts expressed their fear of wild animals, the
cold, the potential for injury, and Bigfoot, which the Tlingit believe
inhabits the islands to which they were banished. However, both took
heart in the knowledge that the banishment would purify their spirits and
that the entire tribe would gather for a day of ceremony and feasting
after which they would be welcomed back into the tribe and their
banishment would never again be mentioned. 23 8 Furthermore, Guthrie
expressed his confidence that upon the conclusion of his banishment
Hollywood would purchase the motion picture rights to the story,
enabling him to make complete restitution to Whittlesey.239
By December, the portents of failure had been proven accurate.
Tlingit tribal officials from the Central Council discovered that Guthrie
and Roberts were living not on separate islands as decreed but on the
Kuiu Island, a mere few miles apart. Roberts' father and grandfather,
who had been making scores of visits to deliver contraband food, radios,
and rifles, ignored repeated tribal cease and desist orders. 240 By early
1995, the two were frequent visitors in towns neighboring their reserva-
tion, and on more than one occasion when Guthrie became violent the
police were summoned. 241 The final straw was the August 1995 transfer
of the duo from Kuiu Island to a small tribally-owned island a mere
three miles and ten minutes from their homes after the U.S. Forestry
Service discovered Kuiu Island was federal land.
237. See Higher Law in Alaska, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 7. 1994, at 12. The process of establishing
Guthrie and Roberts in the locations of their banishment consumed more than $60,000 of tribal
resources and 10,000 man-hours of legal work and manual labor. See Sahagun, supra note 225.
238. See Sangiacomo, supra note 232.
239. See Sangiacomo, supra note 232.
240. See Sangiacomo, supra note 232. The Roberts family routinely permitted Roberts to spend
the night in their home on the reservation.
241. On one occasion Guthrie flew into a rage upon failing a driver's license test; on another he
threatened a dentist during the receipt of dental care. See Exile for 2 Youths is Far Less Lonely Than
Judge Sought, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 6, 1995, at C18.
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F. I TOLD YOU So! TPM GIVEN HARSH REVIEWS
With the banishment now "starting to look more like an extended
camping trip" 242 than a sentence for serious felonies, James was ordered
into court on September 19 by Judge Allendoerfer for a status confer-
ence. James was forced to concede that the Tlingits had failed to live up
to their responsibilities, 243 and that Guthrie and Roberts should be
sentenced to prison. 244
Judge Allendoerfer promptly ordered Guthrie and Roberts to
appear before him on October 3, for a sentencing hearing during which,
while conceding some improvement in the character of the two wrong-
doers, he subtly castigated the failure of the Tlingits to uphold their
agreement.245 Judge Allendoerfer elected to end the experiment while it
could still be deemed a partial success 246 and sentenced Guthrie and
Roberts to prison terms of fifty-five and thirty-one months respectively,
with credit of nearly two years for time served while awaiting trial and
while banished. Judge Allendoerfer also held them jointly liable for
$35,000 in restitution to Whittlesey. 247 Despite the conciliatory nature of
242. Justice Banished?, PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 13, 1995, at C2.
243. Banished Teenagers to Report to Court, PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 20, 1995, at Al0. Although a
13-member panel of Tlingit tribal court judges was split six-to-six with one abstaining on the question
of whether the banishment had been successful, James readily admitted that the pair of wrongdoers
had failed as yet to pay fortheir "horrible crime." Experiment in Tribal Justice Failing for Alaska
Teens, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Sept. 10, 1995, at A6. However, Judge Allendoerfer staunchly main-
tained his insistence that the failure of the banishment was not the fault of either Guthrie or Roberts but
rather the result of familial interference and tribal inability or unwillingness to sanction it. See id.
244. See Michael Sangiacomo, Judge Admits Teens' Banishment a Failure, PLAIN DEALER, Aug.
30, 1995, at 4A. Despite his absolution of Guthrie and Roberts, Judge Allendoerfer nevertheless
believed that prison was in the interests of the offenders as well as of the Tlingit Nation. Id.
245. Although Judge Allendoerfer indicated that the "conflicted performance by the [Tlingit
TPM Court] ha[d] been unfortunate but understandable" given the lack of precedent and divisions
within Tlingit society, his displeasure with the Tlingit judicial system for failing to properly oversee the
banishment is plain from the tenor of his sentencing order. See Report of Proceedings at 4-5, 6, State
v. Guthrie (Nos. 93-1-01369-2, 93-1-01406-1) (Wash. Super. Ct. Oct. 3. 1995) (on file with
Washington Superior Court, County of Snohomish).
246. Judge Allendoerfer's sentencing order read as follows: "I find that this experiment has
some flaws that unfortunately threaten its credibility and integrity. I have determined, therefore, that it
is time, while it can still be ended on a positive note." Judge Ends Experiment with Tribal Justice, CmI.
TRIB., Oct. 4, 1995, at N6 [hereinafter Experiment]. The sentence should not be construed as an
outright rejection of TPM and/or of the traditional sentence of banishment, however. The wording of
Judge Allendoerfer's sentencing order suggests that TPM and traditional restorative measures such as
banishment might be devices to be used in addition to, if not as complete substitutes for, traditional
prison sentences in cases of violent crimes committed by Indians, particularly when ethnic identity is
implicated in the criminal behavior. Specifically, Judge Allendoerfer found that the banishment had
"raised society's expectations of the criminal justice system" by reintroducing long-dormant notions of
remorse and shame and by reawakening concepts of restitution, rehabilitation, discipline, and ethnic
pride. See Report of Proceedings at 2-3, 8, State v. Guthrie (Nos. 93-1-01369-2, 93-1-01406-1)
(Wash. Super. Ct. Oct. 3. 1995) (on file with Washington Superior Court, County of Snohomish).
247. See Experiment, supra note 246. Guthrie and Roberts were released from prison under the
probationary supervision of Judge Allendoerfer, who monitored both for the purpose of collection of
restitution and court costs. However, upon his release from prison in 1996, Guthrie was imprisoned in
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the rhetoric emerging from the Snohomish Superior Court and despite
recent federal support for TPM as manifested in the ITJA, a collective "I
told you so!" resounded through the halls of mainstream legal and politi-
cal institutions. TPM and the American adjudicative system were once
again "jostl[ing] with one another in a market-place of possibilities" 248
characterized less by mutual understanding of and respect for cultural
differences than by majoritarian reactionism.
Although the case of Guthrie and Roberts was not the primary
focus, the politics of state recognition of the sovereign collective rights
of indigenous peoples to employ traditional tribal dispute resolution
became a facet of the evolving contest over the "third-generation" of
human rights.249 The Tlingit attempt to create and apply law in their
own legal institutions made for strange domestic bedfellows. Scholars
from the subdiscipline of law-and-economics entered the fray in the
midst of an ethnocentric and feminist backlash 250 against TPM, suggest-
ing that the tribal sanctioning mechanisms were so fundamentally weak-
ened that incentives to opportunism and defection, such as had occurred
among the Tlingit could not be contained by threats of ostracism, but
Alaska for yet another assault following which he was soon convicted and sentenced to prison for a
federal crime involving an explosive device. See Letter from Hon. Judge James Allendoerfer,
Superior Court of the State of Washington for Snohomish County, to the author (June 27, 2000) (on file
with author). As an indication of the failure of banishment as to his case, Guthrie continues to blame
his problems on his notoriety and the resulting inability to secure gainful employment. See Rebekah
Denn, Crime, Redemption, After Time on an Isolated Alaskan Island, Followed by Prison, a Troubled
Young Man is Getting Another Chance, S EATrLE TIMEs, Jan. 7, 1998, at Al. In contrast, Roberts has
recently been released from prison where he earned a GED and excelled in public speaking classes.
See id. Roberts claims to have matured while undergoing the painful isolation of banishment, and he
speaks now of following the "red road" of spiritual purity (traditional Tlingit religion) to college in
anticipation of a career as a stockbroker. Whittlesey is now divorced as a consequence of the strain
his injuries placed upon his marriage, but he prays that Guthrie and Roberts will make better lives for
themselves. See id.; see also Yeager, supra note 206.
248. Demleitner, supra note 19, at 653.
249. The so-called "first generation" of human rights are civil and political rights enshrined as
universal moral imperatives in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, which obligate state noninter-
ference in what have generally been considered individual rights. See supra notes 26-27 and
accompanying text. "Second generation" human rights are essentially individual entitlements to eco-
nomic, social, and cultural benefits that, while less widely recognized since they arguably require
states to take affirmative action, enjoy the support of much of the international community as
evidenced by the many parties to the International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.
"Third generation" human rights, as expressed in the Draft Declaration, are a recent construction
designed to endow indigenous groups qua groups with legal personality and standing to bring com-
plaints against states for violation of the collective rights of indigenous peoples. Although authoritarian
regimes have been hostile critics of third generation human rights, the greatest functional resistance to
extending practical safeguards and structural protection to indigenous peoples has been mounted by
liberal individualist states, led by the U.S., that claim existing domestic protective measures, whether
positive legislation or constitutionally-based judicial review, are adequate to guarantee the rights of
individuals to participate, or not participate, in cultural groupings. For a discussion of the significance
of third generation rights to the project of reclaiming Indian sovereignty, see generally David
Williams, Legitimation and Statutory Interpretation: Conquest, Consent, and Community in Federal
Indian Law, 80 VA. L. REv. 403, 423-24 (1994).
250. See supra Part III.C.5(c).
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instead by mandated judicial intervention by state and federal govern-
ments. 251 Insightful non-Indian analysis suggested solutions to this and
other "issues of difference" could be discovered through extensive and
respectful dialogue, 252 in the course of which indigenous legal systems
would be afforded more enriched opportunities to establish their
rationality, utility, and proper sphere of operations.253 Non-Indians jeal-
ously guarding political and legal power in the United States were un-
willing to accept the recent Tlingit experience as the model for culturally
distinct indigenous legal communities operating within their midst.
254
251. See Posner, supra note 32, at 155-57. Although he concedes that state imposition of criminal
laws and legal institutions weakens tribal legal systems since tribal members "can [then] depend on the
law to deter them and their children from engaging in deviant behavior," and although "criminal laws
are crude instruments compared to the social pressures that a solitary church can exert," when tribal
members engage in deviant antisocial behavior which threatens the interests of the state and tribal
sanctions fail to modify behaviors or rectify the damage due to the weakening of tribal values, Posner
advocates state intervention to displace traditional tribal legal systems and prevent a "schism" in the
American legal system. See Posner, supra note 32, at 183-86.
252. See Kennedy, supra note 35, at 604.
253. Several scholars suggest that reconceiving the tribal-state-federal tripartite federalist system
as a framework not for subordination or paternalism but for negotiation between sovereigns would
provide a less exploitative and more productive alternative to the current relationship between indige-
nous and non-indigenous peoples in the U.S. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Context and Legitimacy in
Federal Indian Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1973, 1990-92 (1996) (arguing for a general development of
ADR in the field of U.S.-Indian relations); see also Vine Deloria, Jr., Reserving to Themselves:
Treaties and the Powers of Indian Tribes, 38 ARZ. L. REV. 963, 970-72, 979-80 (1996) (arguing that
the historical treaty process should serve as the guideline for a new framework of government-to-
government negotiation). Precisely because cultural views and internal rectitude systems will always
remain divergent as between peoples shaped by very different historical experiences, one commen-
tator, offering the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act as a model, suggested that negotiated sovereign-
to-sovereign compacts between Indian tribes and states could resolve questions of subject matter,
jurisdiction, and conflicts of laws and thereby facilitate the relationship of indigenous and state legal
systems without requiring resort to a unified theory of indigenous rights or international conventions.
See Rosenn, supra note 22, at 255 n.150 (referencing as a model the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,
18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994)).
254. See Rosenn, supra note 22, at 258.
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Indian legal scholars and advocates 256 have attempted to extract and
propound important lessons from the case of the Tlingit pizza bandits.
Although Indian legal scholars already understand the futility of attempt-
ing to transport legal regimes, and in particular TPM, across cultural
boundaries, 257 several suggest the failure of TPM, in cases like that of
Guthrie and Roberts,258 is caused by the absence of a tribal TPM
255. See Mary E. Clark, Symptom of Cultural Pathologies: A Hypothesis, in CONLICr RESOLUTION
THEORY AND PRACTICE: INTEGRATION AND APPLICATION 43, 52 (Dennis J.D. Sandole & Hugo Vander
Merwe eds., 1993). Although the non-Indian majority in the United States is neither unusual nor
deserving of special reprobation for their suppression of dialogue and discussion with their indigenous
peoples; the skewing of the calculus of power in favor of majorities is a global phenomenon, and
[a] powerful hurdle facing cultural self-examination will be the resistance from
those who gain most from the status quo. These often include persons who control the
economic and political power in a society, and those who otherwise benefit from the
institutions that are causing social pathologies. People upholding particular... ideals...
are . . . the guardians of a shared sacred meaning. Because such groups often control
the means of both coercion and persuasion ... they can effectively block the sort of
public dialogue that is needed for successful cultural change.
Id. Still, the unwillingness of many Americans to listen seriously to the third-generation international
human rights claims made by Indian tribes, coupled with the routine consignment to and dismissal of
such claims in domestic political and legal fora where hostile precedent blinds even those who are
prone to providing a sympathetic audience, has sparked concerted discussion of the creation of a
permanent international indigenous legal forum under United Nations auspices. Such an institution
would encourage states to negotiate with their indigenous peoples as equals and to conform their
conduct to the evolving dictates of third-generation human rights and international customary law
standards. See Rosenn, supra note 22, at 248; see also Frickey, supra note 25, at 1777.
256. Although meaningful choice with regard to the development of a legal system is a central
constituent of indigenous sovereignty and to the reauthorization of a national self, it is by no means the
only constituent. However, to many Indian scholars, the threat congressional power poses to tribal
sovereignty cannot be overstated. Given the plenary power of Congress to terminate the federal-tribal
trust relationship, dissolve tribal governments at will, and force Indian individuals into political
association with the state and federal governments, Indians are loathe to surrender any aspect of their
distinctive cultural identity as to do so might thereby establish an important element of the predicate for
such broadly assimilative congressional actions: that Indian tribes are no longer distinct political
entities in need of and entitled to Congressional protection and tutelage. See supra note 193 (referring
to special fiduciary obligation of U.S. to Indian tribes). As one Indian scholar rhetorically frames the
issue, "[i]f assimilation continues, and . . . Indians continue to adopt American cultural values
transmitted to them by their Americanized tribal judicial systems, what will be the reaction of the
federal government when a tribal society is indistinct from American society as a whole?" See Porter,
supra note 21, at 283.
257. Absent an environment of shared ties of kinship and sacred worldview, TPM will prove
dysfunctional in its application. See Ness & Nolan, supra note 146.
258. It is important to reiterate that each tribe is a distinct entity with distinct traditions and needs
relative to its own legal system, and what is an appropriate form of dispute resolution for one tribe may
be wholly inappropriate to another. Economic, political, and legal interests diverge as between tribes
in much the same way as between recognized states, and for TPM to succeed "tribes must bring to the
foreground traditional forms of dispute resolution that will serve as the vehicles through which these
values can be expressed, legitimized, and enforced for their own people, [and] these will [vary] from
tribe to tribe." Haberfeld & Townsend, supra note 53, at 419.
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absence of a tribal TPM tradition is attributable to the displacement of
traditional spiritual values259 by assimilative forces which reward indi-
vidual autonomy at the expense of tribal authority and to a lack of
personal involvement in and commitment to the process on the part of
wrongdoers, their families, and/or tribal authorities. To Porter:
The key to understanding traditional native justice systems
lies in the closed nature of tribal communities and the obliga-
tions of individual tribal members to perpetuate established
norms. Only then can ridicule, ostracism, [and] banishment
• . . all processes utilized by indigenous people to ensure that
individual misconduct was corrected and the community norms
respected and perpetuated-make sense....
Comfort with the system, or more precisely, total under-
standing and acceptance of the system was an integral
component to why peacemaking worked to resolve internal
disputes.260
Furthermore:
[T]he most important factor in a functional [TPM] system is
the extent to which there is willing participation in the system.
With tribal members, the degree of participation depends upon
the value that tribal members place on tribal membership and
how they are perceived by others around them . . . [U]nless
there is some person in the community who, by force of
relationship, respect or even will, can influence the conduct of a
party in dispute, it is impossible for peace to be achieved
willingly.
The devaluation or nonvaluation of relationship is a reality
that any effort to revitalize peacemaking must accommodate.
As indigenous people have evolved and been shaped by the
dominant society, there has been considerable change in the
dynamic that exists between a tribe, its members, and non-
259. See Reisman, supra note 15, at 27 (noting that in the process of colonization of the Ameri-
cas, European colonizers eradicated the "inner worlds of indigenous peoples" and destroyed "[elntire
visions of past and future," to include the traditional spiritual values which produced and nurtured tradi-
tional forms of dispute resolution). Although indigenous peoples have done their best to maintain a
vigorous cultural self-defense against assimilative external forces, the past century has been particular-
ly devastating to the integrity of traditional tribal cultures, and the destruction of traditional spirituality,
which bound individuals to a disciplinary code of personal and collective conduct and responsibility is
a "loss of inestimable value" experienced most acutely in moments of tribal division such as that
occasioned by the debacle of Guthrie and Roberts. See Reisman, supra note 15, at 27.
260. Porter, supra note 21, at 255.
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members. In many tribes, the community may be noticeably
similar to non-Indian communities...
[A]s individuals have become less dependent on the tribe
for their personal economic viability, they perceive that they
are less dependent upon the tribe for their political, social, or
spiritual viability as well. To the extent that an individual can
now physically leave the tribe and still, at least nominally,
provide for basic human needs, individuals have become less
subject to tribal norms. 261
In other words, the overarching objective of reclaiming tribal
sovereignty, carried in no small measure upon the back of tribal projects
reintroducing and refining TPM, should not suffer as the result of the
case of Guthrie and Roberts. In fact, the inability of Tlingit culture to
successfully support and nurture the experimental banishment of the
wrongdoers is at least as much an indictment of the culturally and
spiritually destructive process of U.S. colonialism as, it is a referendum
on the suitability of TPM as a general substitute for the foreign legal
systems imposed upon conquered Indian tribes. Moreover, the case of
Guthrie and Roberts unfairly presented a fledgling TPM system with a
legal load greater than it could legitimately have been expected to bear.
Had Whittlesey been another Tlingit and thus a member of the lawmak-
ing community, or had the crime occurred on the reservation and thus
been the subject of original jurisdiction for the Tlingit tribal court, fewer
exogenous social variables, such as close State and media supervision,
would have been permitted to influence perceptions of the result.26 2
Consequently, substitution of imposed adversarial legal systems with
TPM ought to proceed with caution, with special attention given to the
form and substance of the legal system adopted by each tribe appropri-
ate not only to its culture but also to its disputes. 263 Hybrid or ad hoc
implementation of modified forms of TPM might be in order, and above
all, the royal road to successful substitution of dispute resolutions
systems will be long and replete with obstacles. 264
261. Porter, supra note 21, at 300.
262. To wit, Judge Allendoerfer insists that it was the precise conjunction of attempts to merge
TPM with American jurisprudence with "cross-cultural misunderstandings inflamed by the media" that
overwhelmed the capacity of TPM in the case of Guthrie and Roberts, and his general opinion of tribal
dispute resolution mechanisms remains "respectful and optimistic." See Letter from Hon. Judge James
H. Allendoerfer, Superior Court of the State of Washington for Snohomish County, to the author (June
27, 2000) (on file with author). Moreover, despite and perhaps because of his experience with the
case of Guthrie and Roberts, Judge Allendoerfer, in the event that another case involving "youthful
offenders, who happen to also be struggling with ethnic identity issues" would present itself before
him, would "accept [the] challenge" of TPM again. Id.
263. See Porter, supra note 21, at 304-05.
264. Although cultural, philosophical, and sociological hurdles stand between TPM and its
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At the same time, Indian scholars and activists insist that the recla-
mation of tribal sovereignty, if it is to be found down the path of legal
autonomy, will require the non-Indian majority to first "acknowledge[ ]
the history of indigenous discrimination, discard[ ] the goal of assimila-
tion, and construct[ ] a [new] regime giving dignity and control to indige-
nous people." 265 While Indian tribes still seek a measured separatism
that permits self-determination rather than secession, invigoration of
TPM within the Anglo-American legal tradition presents not simply a
legal problem but a philosophical, even an existential, conflict between
peoples. 266 As history suggests, differences between the dominant and
indigenous jurisprudential views are susceptible of resolution only by
force on the one hand or by mutual respect, recognition, under-
standing, 267 and negotiation on the other.268
application to disputes between Indians and non-Indians or Indians of other tribes, the Canadian
experience with TPM demonstrates that these hurdles are not insurmountable where there is mutual
willingness to clear them. TPM in Canada has been applied, not altogether unsuccessfully, to the
resolution of disputes between Indians and non-Indians, between Indians of different tribes, and
between non-Indians. See Green, supra note 172, at 116-17. While the success of TPM is invariably
a function of the capacity of relevant communities to exert the sort of social control necessary to make
alternative sentences enforceable and meaningful, the domain of persons and disputes in which TPM
can profitably operate need not be defined exclusively by reference to ethnicity, race, or religion: as
Judge Grotsky commented on the suitability of TPM to the resolution of disputes in Canada:
[T]he nature of an offender's community, and its willingness to participate in the
sentencing process, are factors which, in my respectful view, will in each particular
case, depending always on the offender's suitability as a candidate therefore, be
relevant to the determination of whether a sentencing circle ought to be established.
R. v. Cheekinew (1993), 80 C.C.C. (3d) 143, 147 (Sask. Q.B.)
To this might be appended the requirement that the victim, and his community, commit to
participating in the process such that sentences reached have the imprimatur of the party most closely
affected by the offense. TPM as an alternative method of dispute resolution depends ultimately upon
the active, close, and ongoing involvement of multiple communities-those of offenders and
victims-particularly in plural democracies.
265. Gupta, supra note 17, at 1785.
266. See Porter, supra note 21, at 276-77 (stressing that "tribal dispute resolution mechanism[s]
... ha[ve] everything to do with how tribal members interact with one another, how capable they are
of working with [each other] on common endeavors, and thus, how strong their families, clans, com-
munities, and nations will be."); see also Reisman, supra note 15, at 35 (building upon the centrality of
law to the expression of humanity and community by noting that "it is the integrity of the inner worlds
of peoples--their rectitude systems or their sense of spirituality-that is their distinctive humanity.") If
indeed these scholars, one indigenous, the other of immigrant origin, are correct, the humanity of
Indians and non-Indians alike depends upon whether or not both peoples are able to develop peaceful
means to resolve conflicts that arise over the independent management of coexistent legal systems.
267. See Porter, supra note 21, at 303 (opining that "[iut is extremely easy for an Anglo-
American trained lawyer to believe that he or she knows how to deal with any particular legal prob-
lem."); see also Zuni Cruz, supra note 18, at 589 (arguing that a simple legal understanding, from
either the Anglo-American or the traditional Indian perspective, is inadequate, for only "understand-
ing the legal issue from a historical, cultural, social and political perspective as well as from a legal
perspective can mean the difference between resolution of the issue or disruption of the community
and lack of resolution of the issue").
268. See Frickey, supra note 25, at 1780-81 (suggesting that, for proponents of TPM, negotiation
is the sole viable alternative to contestation with the adversarial paradigm and its adherents). Negotia-
tion of protocols between individual tribes and state and federal governments to ensure ongoing sup-
port for and participation in TPM is perhaps the soundest approach to peaceful judicial coexistence.
Such negotiations can establish conditions, substantive guidelines, and procedures to govern the refer-
ral and resolution of cases in TPM; over time the increased continuity and transparency of the process
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Just as even the most ardent advocates of TPM would not impose
traditional Indian methods of dispute resolution upon those who adhere
to the process and substance of other legal systems, federal and state
governments, which have already stripped away so much of tribal legal
autonomy while retaining the power to take what remains, should not
serve as "cultural game warden[s]" 2 69 charged with the power to dictate
to Indian tribes if, how, and when they are entitled to resort to culturally
appropriate methods of dispute resolution. There is room, even in an era
in which the customary international law of indigenous collective rights
does not yet impose obligations on states to respect the right of tribes to
make and apply their own law, for peaceful, negotiated solutions to
disputes that arise. Legal prescriptions and proscriptions drawn from
Anglo-American jurisprudence and caselaw precedents, limited by their
immersion in bloody history, interposed to prevent the function of TPM,
will rarely blaze a trail toward a negotiated cohabitation.
Moreover, differences in legal systems are some of the clearest
expressions of the very essence of cultural difference; as Laurence
understands:
[M]ost people on either side of a boundary prefer their way of
doing things over the way things are done on the other side.
People are funny that way. One should not expect people on
one side of the line to see immediately the superior wisdom of
the other side's ways, or to be tremendously open-minded
about the difference, or to be entirely tolerant of departures
from what is the norm on their side. To expect that is to expect
too much: either the Indians have to surrender their old ways
to the younger, headstrong, diverse, European- and African-
and Asian-influenced dominant society, or the non-Indians
have to all become New Agers, honoring the Earth Mother,
replicating the Sun Dance, and resolving their disputes alterna-
tively. Don't count on it. To use Sam Deloria's famous offer-
ing, one should not expect to hear from one side of the line the
may be successful in capturing the interest and approval of non-Indian critics, in reducing Indian
"feelings of estrangement and separation from the Anglo-[American] justice system," and, even more
importantly, in reducing the rates of Indian offending and incarceration. Green, supra note 172, at
124. Moreover, negotiations between state and federal governments and Indian tribes conducted as
between mutual sovereigns will aid in furthering the development of mutual respect, tolerance, and
peaceful coexistence.
By the same token, negotiation between modernists and traditionalists will be necessary if
negotiations between Indian tribes and non-Indian governments are to be productive, for even if it is
unrealistic to expect that all Indian people will come to re-embrace TPM as the appropriate alternative
to the Anglo-American legal system it is essential, as the case of Guthrie and Roberts makes clear, that
divisions within Indian tribes not project themselves across borders to compromise the effectiveness of
tribal efforts to reclaim legal autonomy from those who have suppressed it for centuries.
269. Rosenn, supra note 22, at 252-53.
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sound of ten thousand hands slapping ten thousand foreheads:
"Damn. Why didn't we think of that?" 270
Despite the tortured history of U.S.-Indian relations, the entrenched
interests supporting and benefiting from the imposition of Anglo-
European law upon Indian tribes, and the highly publicized disappoint-
ment of the Tlingit attempt to implement TPM, if the dominant society
will undertake to shed assumptions of Indian inferiority, recognize
indigenous jurisprudence as worthy of respect, and accord Indian tribes
the status of coequal negotiating partners, a dialectic may develop and
lead to greater legal diversity, greater mutual cultural respect, and above
all a more peaceful coexistence. Moreover, this new harmonious
paradigm of U.S.-Indian relations may serve as a model for other
indigenous groups and other states across the globe against which to
pattern their future relationships in a more morally, legally, and socially
attractive fashion. Such; is the hope for our shared and interdependent
future.
270. Laurence, supra note 113, at 118-19.
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